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Foreword 
This thesis began when, working for the North Slope Borough's whale census, 
I had the opportunity to observe Barrow's whale harvest. I became interested 
in the work of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, and how it had come to 
be. I would like to thank the many people and organizations who have helped 
me with the conception and research of this thesis : Dr. Thomas Albert, Ben 
Nageak, Geoff Carroll and Craig George of the North Slope Borough Department 
of Wildlife Management; Marie Adams of the North Slope Borough and 
formerly of the AEWC; Lynn Sutcliffe, Jessica Lefevre and Kate McGhee of Van 
Ness, Feldman, Sutcliffe & Curtis; Dr. Ray Gambell of the IWC; Jacob Adams of 
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation and first Chairman of the AEWC; Edward 
Hopson, Chairman, and Rosie Habeich of the AEWC; John Bockstoce of the Old 
Dartmouth Historical Society; Stephen Braund of Stephen R. Bnfund & 
Associates; Peter Speak of the Scott Polar Research Institute; Trinity Hall, 
Cambridge; and the B.B. Roberts Fund. They and many others have given 
support and encouragement, for which I am grateful. 
Any errors of fact or judgment are, however, entirely mine. 
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ABSTRACT 
In 1977 the International Whaling Commission (IWC) deleted the exemption 
that allowed Alaska Eskimos to harvest the bowhead whale. This sparked 
considerable controversy. The IWC had not previously exerted authority 
over aboriginal whaling. The Eskimos responded by forming the Alaska 
Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC). Protests by the whalers led to the es-
tablishment of a quota system still in effect today. In response to pressures 
from the IWC and other outside agencies, the AEWC developed its own Man-
agement Plan for bowhead harvests. In 1981, this was incorporated into a 
Cooperative Agreement between the AEWC and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, a Federal agency. Management authority and 
administration are delegated to the AEWC, and this system has worked ef-
fectively. The AEWC has also made great strides in increasing the efficiency 
of the harvest, through whaling workshops and through weapons im-
provemenis. The challenge ahead is to protect bowhead habitat from the ef-
fects of offshore industrial activity, primarily oil and gas exploration. This 
paper examines the formation of the AEWC, its development as an institu-
tion, its management of Eskimo whaling, and the implications for other lo-
cal wildlife management regimes. 
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Chapter 1 
Beginnings 
The whale is more than food to us. It is the center of our life 
and culture. We are the People of the Whale. The taking and 
sharing of the whale is our Eucharist and Passover. The 
whaling festival is our Easter and Christmas, the Arctic cele-
bration of the mysteries of life. 
--Eben Hopson (Indian Affairs, 1978-79:7) 
Pre -Contact Whaling 
For several thousand years Eskimos have hunted the bowhead whale , 
balaena mysticetus (IWC, 1982c:36). Since about 800 A.D. Yupik and Inupiat 
Eskimos in northern Alaska have regularly taken bowheads (Bockstoce , 
1980:54) (see Figure 1). The size of the whale--up to over sixty feet and sixty 
tons--made it an important part of the subsistence harvest. The taste of the 
whale made it a prized item. The communal nature of the hunt and tne 
sharing of the whale gave it the central place in the spiritual and physical 
culture of the region . The bounty of the whale required and allowed the 
development of large, permanent settlements along the Alaska coast. The 
whale provided life, meaning and identity . 
The invention that made whaling possible was the toggle-head har-
poon (ibid.). A sealskin float would be attached by line to the harpoon head, 
which would rem ain stuck in the whale. Ti red by the d rag of the float, 
which also . marked its position, the whale could be killed by lance. Many 
crews could be involved in the capture of a whale , attaching several fl oats 
to a single whale and helping to chase the harpooned whale. Cooperative 
hunting was an --effective, efficient and reliable way to harvest the whales. 
The number of peop le involved in this type of hunti ng created a 
need for much larger villages than could be supported without the whale 
(ibid.). These vill ages were--and are--located on points of land or islands 
where the whales pass close by as they migrate north each spring along 
near-shore leads in the pack ice (Rainey, 1947 :235). While other sea mam-
mals and land animals were available in large numbers, none allowed such 
a dramatic change in lifestyle. And no other animal produced · the rich rit-
ual, ceremonial and spiritual associations of the bowhead (Little and Rob-
bins, 1984: 35-6). 
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Figure 1. · Map of Alaska Eskimo Whaling Villages and Bowhead Migration 
Routes 
One great advantage of dependence on the sea was the stability of the food supply, which is more reliable than the fluctuating populations of land animals (Bockstoce, 1980:54) . The complexity of whaling rituals and 
the limitations of whaling weapons kept the catch of whales down (Thornton, 1931: 165). Perhaps this provided insurance that a year without a 
whale , due perhaps to the vagaries of ice and weather, would not be 
catastrophic to a community grown too large to support itself on other 
animals. In any case, people and whales lived together in a stable system (Bockstoce, 1980:54). 
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The Commercial Whalin g Era 
was drastically changed. Captain Thomas Roys 
the Bering Strait, the first commercial whaler 
(Bockstoce , 1986:21). Over the next seventy 
years, perhaps 18,000 whales were taken from an initial population of 
30,000 (Bockstoce and Botkin, 1980). This decimation of the stock obviously 
affected the balance between whales and Native whalers. The presence of 
the Yankee whalers also influenced patterns of Eskimo whaling and of Es-
kimo society in general (Bockstoce, 1986; C. Brower, 1942). 
In 1848, that system 
sailed the Superior through 
to reach the western Arctic 
Following Roys's discovery of an unexploited stock of whales--slow, 
docile and rich in oil and baleen--Yankee whale ships sailed north in huge 
numbers. At first, the whalers followed the opened leads of summer, and 
sailed south before the ice closed in. Then came the practice of overwin-
tering locked in the ice, to get a head start on whaling the following year. 
The final development was the establishment of shore-based whaling sta-
tions, adopting the Eskimo practice of whaling in small boats based on the 
edge of the shore-fast ice (Bockstoce, 1977; 1986). This last stage brought 
many Eskimo whalers into the commercial system, and introduced them ·to 
the whale bomb, a considerable improvement over the lance (Thornton, 
1931:1 71; Bockstoce, 1986). 
Bockstoce writes that the Yankee and Eskimo whalers "for the most 
part co-existed peacefully and--in the perception of each--with mutual 
benefit (1986:13) ." The techniques and knowledge of the Eskimos comple-
mented the more modem weapoons of the commercial whalers. But the 
practices and purposes of the two groups were at odds . The commerci al 
whalers, in competition to get the most whales and the largest profit, did 
not have the Eskimos' spiritual rel ationship to the whales and to whaling. 
' When whales became scarce, the whalers took walrus, reducing the walrus 
population so drastically that villages dependent upon walrus for meat 
starved during the winter (ibid.). An outside influence had destroyed the 
balance that had allowed the establishment of large permanent villages 
along the Alaskan Arctic coast. 
The other tragic effect of the commercial whalers' presence was the 
introduction of disease. Influenza, measles, tuberculosis and other fatal or 
destructive illnesses killed many people, destroyed whole communities, and 
made some villages unable to continue whaling because there were too few 
people (C. Brower, 1942; Bockstoce, 1986; Burch, 1985). While the population 
of Arctic Alaska is increasing today, it is only rebounding to the pre-con-
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tact level (Rosita Worl, 1977). Villages such as Kaktovik and Kivalina began 
whaling again in the 1960s; Nuiqsut was re-established in 1973 by families 
from Barrow; Little Diomede Island residents wish to start whaling again 
(Alaska Consultants and Stephen Braund, 1984; Burch, 1985; Hoffman et al., 
1988; Jessica Lefevre, pers. comm.). The established technological patterns 
have undergone considerable change. The underlying associations and be-
liefs have not. 
By 1920, commercial whaling had effectively ended. The market 
gone, no one was willing to risk the expense of outfitting a whale ship 
(Bockstoce, 1977:52). The legacy of whale bombs and other Yankee innova-
tions aided the Eskimo whalers in the harvest of the bowhead. In most other 
respects, whaling returned to the form and status it held before the com-
mercial whaling era. 
After Commercial Whaling 
Although whaling practices had returned to the old way, the influ-
ence of Western culture on Eskimo culture continued. Missionaries, 
.. -
schoolteachers and nurses had arrived in the nineteenth century. Geolo-
gists, meteorologists and explorers came as well. The 1920s were the heyday 
of the Fur Market era. The fur trade replaced commercial whaling as the 
non-subsistence economic opportunity of the region (Arundale and 
Schneider, 1987:61-3). 
In 1946 the Arctic Construction period began, providing for the first 
time substantial wage employment opportunities on the North Slope 
(ibid.:67). Part of this development, the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory 
(NARL), was established in Barrow in 1947. Albert summarizes the signifi-
cance of NARL's presence on the North Slope: 
By the mid-1970s many of the people moving into decision 
making pcisitions in the North Slope Borough, the Arctic Slope 
Regional Corporation, and the Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation 
had earlier worked at the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory 
(NARL) in Barrow, Alaska, or they had worked in the field 
with NARL scientists. Almost without exception this involve-
ment with NARL and its scientists helped create a positive 
outlook toward both research itself and the uses of science for 
helping Native people. NARL helped establish the idea that 
science was "good" (Albert, 1988 :1 8). 
This attitude is an important part of current management of Eskimo whal-
ing, to which we will return . 
1 0 
In 1968 , oil in vast quantities was di scovered at P rudhoe Bay, greatly 
ex panding the monetary wealth of the region. In 1971, Arctic Slope Re-gional Corporation (ASRC) was created under the terms of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. In 1972, the North Slope Borough was established , 
with simil ar boundaries to ASRC. It provides gove rnmental services to North Slope villages, and is financed chiefly from taxation of oil operations in the Prudhoe Bay area (McBeath and Morehouse , 1980 :82) . 
In the face of such change, and perhaps aided by the increase in 
cash flow, there was an increase in whaling in the early and mid 1970s. Like the re-establishment of Nuiqsut, this may have reflected a growing 
cultural awareness and identity at the time (Alaska Consultants and Stephen Braund, 1984:4). A decline in caribou populations also increased dependence on marine mammals for food at this time (IWC, 1982c:41-2). Pe-terson (1978) claims that in the long-term view, this increase was not a dramatic change--under changing conditions, it had happened before. 
Traditionally, a major obstacle to becoming a whaling captain was the accumulation of sufficient wealth to outfit a crew. The captain usually 
.-~ provides all the equipment, plus food for his crew for the duration of the hunt. Before the appearance of a cash economy, captaincy was often in-herited , along with the necessary equipment. The development of the mon-
etary system allo wed the purchase of such equipment and supplies, hence 
allowing a greater number of men to outfit crews. 
The cost of outfitting a crew was $10,000 in 1978 and $16,000 in 1985 (IWC, 1982c:39; Worl and Smythe, 1986 : 156), so that even with a cash-based 
economy , whaling is a major undertaking . Also, a whaling crew must be 
recruited. Worl observes , 
Rare is the crewman who would join an inexperienced whaler to pursue a 30 to 60 foot whale in a 20 foot skin boat, no matter how much money the younger man had. Captains traditionally begin as young apprentices (Worl, 1977:4). 
Worl also shows that during previous periods of economic wealth in this century-- the Fur Market era of the 1920s and the Arctic Construction period of the late 1940s and early 1950s-- there was a decrease in whaling 
ac tiv ity, because men were working rather than whaling (ibid .). This 
supports the idea that other factors than money were involved in the in-
crease in whaling in the 1970s. 
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1970 1 971 1972 
• Known 
9 Estimated 
1973 1974 
Year 
1975 1976 
Number of Bowhead Whaling Crews m Alaska Eskimo 
Whaling Villages, 1970-77 · (Alaska Consultants and 
Stephen R. Braund, 1984:29) 
Landed 
26 
24 
41 
37 
20 
15 
48 
29 
Struck-but-Lost 
10 
3 1 
28 
43 
82 
47 
51 
43 
91 
111 
Ta ble 1. Number of Bowhead Whales Landed and Lost by Alaska Eskimos, 
1970-77 (Alaska Consultants and Stephen R. Braund, 1984:28) 
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1977 
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Whatever the cause, in the 1970s, both the number of crews involved in the hunt and the number of whales struck increased greatly (see Figure 2 and Table 1). Great concern was voiced over the increase in crews and the increase in whales struck but lost (McVay, 1979; IWC, 1980; Van Note, 1981). Regarding the whaling effort as reflected in the number of crews, Mar-quette states that "although a large number of crews are outfitted with whaling gear, the number that actively engage in whaling throughout the season is significantly smaller (1977: 11)." Of 36 crews in Barrow in 1976, an average of only 11 participated at every opportunity during the season (ibid.). Perhaps the demands of a wage economy lead to a great increase in part-time whalers, balancing both activities as best they can (Worl, 1977; author's obs.). 
As far as struck-but-lost totals are concerned, it is likely that the ap-parent dramatic increase in this figure is misleading. Whether the ac-counting practices of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) over-or under-estimated the number (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1977:41), these figures had not been reported with any accuracy before the 1970s. For example, Thornton reports the catch at Wales in 1889 as 3 landed, 12 lost; 0 and 2 in 1890, and 1 and 29 for 1891 (1931:170-1). 
Nonetheless, the harvests of the 1970s were much higher than for the previous 60 years. While the total catch between 1910 and 1969 was 704 whales for an average of 11. 7 per year, the 1970-77 total was 259, an aver-age of 32.4 (Marquette and Bockstoce, 1980:14). At its Annual Meeting in June 1977 the International Whaling Commission (IWC) reacted to concern over these figures and low population estimates for the bowhead, and deleted the right of the Eskimos for the aboriginal subsistence hunt of , the bowhead whale (IWC, 1978a). 
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Chapter 2 
Controversy 
The Bering Sea stock gives most cause for concern, with in-
creased catches and "struck-but-lost" whales reported. . . . The 
Commission . . . accepted the proposal ... to delete the words 
"or right" from Schedule paragraph 7, which gives exemption 
for certain aboriginal whale fisheries. 
--International Whaling Commission (1978a) 
We were real angry, but we wanted to obey the law, too. 
--Benjamin P. Nageak 
The IWC Takes Action 
When the International Whaling Commission (IWC) made its decision 
to remove aboriginal hunting rights to the bowhead whale, it knew it was 
taking a drastic step. Its data, however, indicated that drastic measures were 
needed to save the bowhead from extinction. The population in 1977 was es-
timated by the IWC to be between 800 and 2000 (IWC, 1978b:67). Though 1--
these figures were of doubtful reliability (Underwood, 1977), with the total 
whales struck in 197 6 at 91 and the total for 1977 at 111, they caused great 
concern. Eskimo whaling appeared to be inefficient and out of hand (IWC, 
1978; McVay, 1979). 
Jacob Adams , a whaling captain and the first Chairman of the AEWC, 
says that · the whalers were considering methods of improving the harvest 
when the IWC's action forced their hand (pers. comm.). In Barrow, the Bar-
row Whaling Captains Association (BWCA) had existed since the middle of 
the century (Langdon, 1984:46). With written by-laws defining the shares 
of a whale for the crews involved in a catch and other rules of the harvest 
(BWCA, 1987), a mechanism existed for further management of the hunt. 
While such orga~izations existed in most of the whaling villages (Freeman, 
in press:13), nothing of the sort existed for the villages as a group. 
Reactions to the IWC ban were quick and loud. The whalers felt be-
trayed by the U.S. government (Arctic Coastal Zone Management Newsletter 
[ACZMNJ, 1977[5]:3; J. Adams, 1979b).Under Federal law, the United States 
Government has a trust obligation to Native Americans (Case, 1984). The Es-
kimos felt that the government had not even bothered to inform the Eski-
mos about what was happening, much less live up to its responsibility to act 
on their behalf (J. Adams, 1982). 
On September 1, 1977, whaling captains from the nine active whal-
lllg villages in Alaska formed the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission. In so 
14 
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doing, the whalers set the battle at an institutional level, creating an orga-
nization to fight against the pressures and regulations imposed from the 
outside, and to protect the individual whalers and whaling villages against 
those forces. Acting alone, whalers and their villages could do little. 
Through the AEWC, the whalers could provide a solid front and a much 
more effective voice opposing those who would stop the hunt. 
On the other side, most conservationists were pleased with the ban. 
In commenting on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, many orga-
nizations argued that the U.S. should not file an objection to the IWC's ac-
tion (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1977). Such an objection would remove the 
U.S.'s obligation to enforce that action, and the Eskimos tried without suc-
cess to get the U.S to file an objection. Within the government there was 
disagreement about the possibility of objecting. The Department of the In-
terior lobbied in favor of an objection, stating in a letter to Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance, "filing an objection accompanied by responsible action 
is, in our opinion, the most honest and effective course (Joseph, 1977).'' 
Conservationists argued that an objection would undermine the U.S. pO£r-
tion as a leading advocate of whale conservation (Garrett, 1977). 
Many conservationists and others also argued that Eskimo whaling is 
no longer a necessary subsistence activity, nor does it have any real cul-
tural links to aboriginal whaling. Tony Mallin of Project Save Our Whales 
argued that: 
Until the eskimo [sic] goes back to hunting with his primitive 
weapons such as bone tipped harpoons we cannot take seri-
ously his claim about disrupting a culture that isn't even there 
to be disrupted (in U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1977:116). 
Addressing two other concerns of conservationists , an editiorial m . Orea 
cla imed: 
The crucial -question is not whether food of comparable nutri-
tional quality could be supplied or found locally. Rather the 
pro b 1 em is precisely that Eskimos want to hunt, kill and eat 
whales so much that they refuse substitutes or alternatives. 
The vital significance of bowheads to modem Eskimos is tro-12.h.Y. hunting (emphasis in original) (O r ea , 1979:19). 
Bonner also claims on similar grounds that "Bowhead whaling 1s quite 
indefensible (1980:254).' ' Because whaling captains are the traditional lead-
ers among the Eskimos , Bonner argues that whaling is therefore a matter of 
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status, of trophy hunting, to enhance the individual's image rather than to 
sustain a culture (ibid.) . 
The AEWC's Response 
While the whalers had initially felt betrayed by the lack of govern-
mental support, they became outraged by . these statements that were per-
ceived as a vicious attack on their culture. In a statement entitled "You Will 
Not Bury Our Hearts (at Wounded Knee or Anywhere Else)" , the Commis-
sioners of the AEWC framed the dilemma: 
By October 24 the United States must decide whether to pre-
serve the Eskimo's historic right to hunt the bowhead whale · 
or whether to abide by the abrupt and culturally genocidal 
actions of the IWC (AEWC, 1977:1). 
Jacob Adams described the Eskimos' battle as follows: 
The struggle to convince the U.S . government to object to the 
action taken by the IWC was an uphill battle because we found 
that the U.S. delegation was dominated by the left-wing con-
servationist who knew nothing about Eskimo culture and its 
relationship to the bowhead whale. . . . Remaining firm and 
strong has gotten the Eskimos through what is probably the 
toughest assault ever on any culture in the world (J. Adams, 
1982: 10, 13). 
Clearly there was no compromise between these positions. 
Some outside organizations, however, were unwilling to jump on the 
bandwagon of conserv ation at the expense of the Eskimos. Pamela Rich of 
Friends of the Earth wrote to Eben Hopson: 
The data disturbs us because we are concerned about the sur-
vival of the Bowhead, and because we recognize how import ant 
the survival of the Bowhead is to the well-being and livelihood 
of the Inupiat. . . . I think this places a responsibili ty on the 
Inupiat to put together a "conservation plan" which details 
your cultural /physical /economical relati onship to subsi stence 
hunting of the Bowhead, and the ways in which you can act as 
managers of the precious whale resource (Rich, 1977). 
This recognizes one fact that was less than obvious to many outsiders: 
no one cares more about or has a higher stake in the preser-
vation of the bowhead whale than do the Eskimo (A. Brower, 
Jr., 1987a). 
For the outsider, the bowhead is a matter of abstract concern; for the Es-
kimo, a very practical one. 
1 6 
The creation of the AEWC was a very practical step. By looking past 
the acrimony of the debate characterized above, the whalers began formu-
lating a constructive response to the events that had occurred. The By-Laws 
of the AEWC state: 
The purposes of the Commission shall be to preserve and en-
hance the marine resource of the bowhead whale including 
protection of its habitat; to protect Eskimo subsistence bow-
head whaling; to protect and enhance Eskimo culture, tradi-
tions and activities associated with bowhead whales and bow-
head whaling; and to undertake research and educational ac-
tivities related to bowhead whales (AEWC, n.d.a) . 
The AEWC had the task of correcting the misconceptions of Eskimos, whales 
and the relationship between the two. In addition, the AEWC had to fill the 
gap left by the U.S. government. Little of the research requested by the 
IWC's Scientific Committee had been carried out, and little was known about 
the bowhead whale. To save the 1978 hunt, however, a quicker response was 
needed. 
.-~ 
F igh t ing the Regulations 
The whalers had three battles to fight. First, they fought the regula-
tions that forbade them to whale. Second, they fought the jurisdiction of the 
IWC to regulate aboriginal whaling . Third , they fought the ignorance--sci -
entific and cultural--that had led to the ban. 
Because the concern of the IWC had been relayed to the Eskimos only 
after the ban had been adopted , the whalers had to respond quickly to pro-
tect their ri ght to hunt the foll owing year. Scientific studies or court bat-
tles could take considerable time. F ighting against the regulations, or en-
forcement of the regulations, was the most direct means of attack. 
The easies_t solution the Eskimos saw was fo r the U.S to file an obj ec-
tion with the IWC, which would exempt the U.S. from abiding by the IWC's 
action . In light of the considerable uncertainty about the status of the 
whale, many people thought this would be appropriate. The pressu re would 
be off, and a better assessment of the situation could be made, leading to a 
better-informed response. Another possibility was to wait until the 1978 
IWC Annual Meeting to make an attempt to convince the IWC to rescind its 
restriction. This would have meant no hunt in 1978. The third ' possibility , 
and the one taken, was to place the matter on the agenda for the December 
1977 Special Meeting of the IWC in Tokyo (U.S. Dept of Commerce, 1977:110, 
145, 194ff). 
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Opposition to filing an objection was based primarily on two argu-
ments. One, the Eskimos had no right to hunt the bow head anyway, and so 
the IWC action should be allowed to stand on its own merits (ibid.:l 16, 118, 
etc.). Two, objecting to an action restricting whaling would end U.S. leader-
ship in the whale conservation movement. In neither view was much ac-
count taken of the Eskimos. Either they had no legitimate claim--cultural or 
otherwise--to their whaling activities, or they were an expendable adjunct, 
worthy only to be sacrificed for the cause of saving the whales. 
Because no objection was filed, the IWC deletion of aboriginal hunt-
ing rights for the bowhead whale took force. Under pressure from the Es-
kimos and the recognition of the government's responsibility to them, the 
U.S. placed the bowhead question on the IWC agenda for the December 1977 
meeting (J. Adams, pers. comm.; ACZMN, 1977[6]:3). The Federal Register, the 
bulletin of government regulations and actions, on November 25, 1977, 
contained the following m relation to Native bowhead whaling: 
. . . bowhead whale is designated as a depleted species (NMFS, 1977:60150). 
..-
The bowhead has been determined to be depleted and, there-fore, regulations are being proposed for the taking of that 
species. . . . all taking will be prohibited unless the IWC takes further action prior to the 1978 hunt. In order to provide for a 
controlled subsistence hunt by the Eskimos which would pre-
serve the central elements of their culture and which would protect the bowhead stock, the United States has developed a 
comprehensive scientific research program and a conserva-tion regime for bowheads. The scientific research program 
and the conservation regime will be presented to the IWC Sci-
entific Committee meeting on November 21-25, 1977, and to a 
special meeting of the IWC December 6-7, 1977. The United States will seek an exemption from the Convention for an Alaskan Eskimo bowhead whale hunt on the basis of the U.S. domestic implementation of the scientific research and con-
servation ··programs and consistent with the regula tions p ro-posed herein. . . . The total number of bowhead whales autho-
rized to be · taken in calendar year 1978 shall not exceed 30 
struck or 15 landed, whichever occurs first (NOAA, 1977:60185-6) . 
The IWC granted a quota of 18 struck or 12 landed (IWC, 1979a) , later raised 
by two whales for the 1978 fall hunt (IWC, 1979b). 
The quota took the immediate pres sure off the situation, · but did little 
to address the concerns of the Eskimos . They felt the quota to be absurdly 
low. Relations between the U.S. delegates to the IWC and the Eskimos were 
strained at best. Eben Hopson had dec lared in September 1977 that the 
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whalers would hunt, that the IWC had no jurisdiction over the Eskimos 
(ACZMN, 1977[6]:l). When no objection was filed, the only hope for a legal 
hunt was convincing the IWC to amend its restrictions. Here, too, the 
whalers felt their rights were given little consideration. 
The suspicion that existed between the whalers and the relevant 
government officials ran deep. The whalers felt they could not trust the 
U.S. delegates to the IWC. Tom Garrett, Deputy Commissioner to the IWC and a 
lobbyist for Defenders of Wildlife, testified at the Environmental Impact 
Statement hearings in Washington, D.C., September 1977: 
I think the increasing hunt is evidence of the dissolution of 
the Eskimo culture. I believe the hunt, as it is at present being 
conducted, and its current expansion, are in fact nothing 
more or less than a function of dissolution of the Eskimo cul-
ture, which is tragic but none-the-less happening. . . . this is a 
sort of bastard culture, not used in the pejorative sense, of the 
methods that commercial whalers brought in and original Es-
kimo methods (in ACZMN, 1977[6]:6). 
The Eskimos did not feel well represented at the IWC. 
Recognizing the limitations of fighting within this system, the 
whalers also fought against the system. In October 1977, Jacob Adams filed 
suit against Cyrus Vance to compel Vance to file an objection to the IWC ac-
tion (Adams v. Vance, 1977). In the District Court, Vance was ordered to file 
such an objection, but an appeal overturned this decision. The opinion 
stated: 
an order directing action by the Secretary of State in foreign 
affairs, would deeply intrude into the core concerns of the ex-
ecutive · branch . . an objection, even subsequently with-
drawn, would substantially harm the efforts by the United 
States to promote an effective international machinery for the 
protection of marine mammals (ibid. :950). 
To the whalers, polJtics again seemed to overshadow their rights. Jacob 
Adams describes what happened next: 
The Eskimos then went to the Supreme Court. Word came that 
Justice Marshall would hear our plea, then at the last moment, 
the Chief Justice personally took the case and refused to hear 
the case. To this day, I believe this was a result of politic al 
pressure on the Carter Administration by the conservationist (J. Adams, 1982:10). 
Again, the whalers had come to a dead end. 
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Fighting IWC Jurisdiction 
Taking a different tack, in July 1978 Eben Hopson filed suit against 
Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, claiming that the IWC had no juris-
diction over aboriginal whaling, and therefore enforcing the quota vio-
lated the Eskimos' rights. The District Court dismissed this case on the 
grounds that questions of IWC authority were a foreign relations isue, and 
thus outside the court's jurisdiction (Hopson v. Kreps, 1979). An appeal 
found that the District Court did have jurisdiction, so the Appelate Court 
sent the case back to the Distrtict Court (Hopson v. Kreps, 1980). At this 
stage, both parties agreed to suspend the case without prejudicing either 
side's position (S. Lynn Sutcliffe, pers. comm.) 
Fighting Ignorance 
The third front on which the Eskimos fought was the most difficult. 
The whalers had to counteract the ignorance of the outside world in regard 
to their way of life. They also had to fight to earn the respect of outside 
agencies and other interested groups. .-
In 1977, not a great deal was known to Western science about 
the bowhead whale. Population figures were at best only informed guesses, 
behavior and migration patterns were only roughly charted , reproduction 
and mortality were estimated by comparison with other baleen whales. 
Through the Naval Arctic 
--- -------- --------------
Year Whales Year Whales 
1977 600 -1 800 1983 3857 
1978 2264 1984 3871 
1979 2264 1985 4417 
1980 2264 1986 4417 
1981 2264 1987 7200 
1982 3857 1988 7200 
Table 2. IWC Bowhead Population Estimates, 1977-88 
(IWC Reports, AEWC files) 
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Research Laboratory, many of the Eskimo leaders during this crisis had 
seen the fruits of scientific research and the importance of scientific 
formation (see Chapter 1). Thus, obtaining accurate data was one of the 
tial priorities of the AEWC: 
The whalers recognized that their intuitive knowledge of the 
bowhead could not be easily communicated to the outside 
world. They also realized that the present body of information 
concerning the bowhead whale was woefully inadequate and 
even misleading. The whalers therefore recognized the need 
for extensive scientific investigation of the bowhead whale to 
insure continuing existence of both the bowhead whale and 
Eskimo society (AEWC, 1981 a). 
in-
ini-
Of primary interest to the whalers, of course, was a population study to 
prove the whalers' claim that the bowhead population was large and in-
creasing (Rosita Worl, 1977)(see Table 2). 
Promoting Scientific Research .--
One key to sound management of a resource is a detailed under-
standing of both the resource and the role it plays in its environment. Be-
cause such information about the bowhead whale was not known or was not 
in scientific form at the time of the IWC's first action, sound scientific man-
agement was not then possible. The Scientific Committee of the IWC recom-
mended a zero quota because its information was insufficient to recommend 
any other course. Like its development of a management plan to fill a gap, 
the AEWC · quickly embraced scientific research as a means of proving the 
biological acceptability of the Eskimos' harvest. 
The AEWC's commitment to science was and is greater than just sup-
porting the research of others. In addition to cooperating with the scien-
tists of various goyernment agencies, the AEWC in 1980 formed its own Sci-
ence Advisory Committee. The advantage of this was noted in the Prospectus 
of the Committee: 
The AEWC already has cooperated in a number of research 
programs on the bowhead whale and has recently conducted 
its own research effort. The AEWC always has sought consul-
tation and advice for the design of environmental research 
programs. Recently, it has expressed a desire to formalize this 
procedure through a Science Advisory Committee reporting to 
the Chairman of the AEWC (AEWC, 1981d:5). 
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Now the AEWC could focus research efforts on its own priorities rather than 
relying on the directions of others. 
The AEWC had already sponsored some research in addition to that 
carried out by the government, but the Science Advisory Committee was 
able to recommend a more comprehensive approach to the marine ecosys-
tem of the Arctic coast (ibid. :7-9, 17-19). Another advantage of the Commit-
tee format was the ability to take a long-term view of the AEWC's needs and 
goals relating to bowhead whaling management. 
Of prime concern is the extent of off-shore oil exploration which 
may or may not alter the migration and behavior of the whales, in addition 
to creating the potential threat of an oil spill (AEWC, 1981d; Gambell, 1983; 
Neilsen, 1988; Edward Hopson, pers. comm.) . Marie Adams, then Executive 
Director of the AEWC, adressing the First Conference on the Biology of the 
Bowhead Whale in January 1982, summed up the situation: 
We are gathered here together to discuss how best to obtain knowledge about the bowhead whale. It is an elusive animal that lives in the last frontier, the environment now being threatened by development. The reason why we human beings 
would like to know more about the bowhead whale is basically for man to decide the fate of an entire subsistence whaling 
culture that depends on the bowhead whale. If science shows that the bowhead whales are increasing, we as subsistence hunters have a slight chance of surviving as true Eskimo 
whalers. Then there is the other side: if science is used to show that the bowhead whale is declining, the Eskimo is endan-gered, as is the bowhead whale, because of the strong tie that 
we have wi th the whale and no one strives to protect the 
whale as the Eskimo. Either way we look at it, the responsibil -ity that the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission has under-taken iri sponsoring this conference is indeed a grave one (M. Adams, 1982:16). 
.--
The controversy over whaling had sparked the whalers' interest in ob-
taining scientific data that could be used to protect the whalers and the 
whales. 
Promoting Eskimo Culture 
In addition to lack of knowledge about whales was the lack of knowl-
edge and understanding about the whalers. Already upset because they had 
heard little in advance about the possibility of the whaling · ban, the 
whalers then faced what they felt was a frontal assault on their culture. A 
brief characterization of the conservationists' views regarding Eskimos 
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and Eskimo whaling has been given above . Part of the AEWC's mission was 
to correct these misconceptions. 
One illustrative misconception was the idea that gray whales would 
be a suitable substitute for bowheads. Abundant, migrating north as far as 
Barrow, about the same size as bowheads, and even occasionally hunted by 
the Eskimos, the gray whales appeared to some as the perfect substitute for 
the endangered bowhead. Storro-Patterson (1980) argued that existing 
objections to gray whaling could be overcome, and that since Eskimos have 
traditionally adapted to changing conditions, why not do so now by 
switching whales? While Durham argued that gray whale meat 1s 
acceptable for eating (in Storro-Patterson, 1980), both neglected the more 
fundamental issue of cultural significance. 
Marie Adams and Ray Dronenburg of the AEWC responded to the 
Storro-Patterson report, pointing out the shortcomings of the gray whale: 
it arrives late, and according to whalers on St. Lawrence Island who occa-
sionally take a gray whale, the meat is often wasted because it does not taste 
good (Adams and Dronenburg, 1980). The pattern of whaling would a!s.o 
shift, interfering with caribou and bird hunting, as well as changing the 
form of the hunt and the cooperation that is so important (Marquette and 
Braham, 1982). Krupnik, with reference to aboriginal whaling along 
Siberia's Chukchi coast, shows that gray whales are unacceptable as nutri-
tional or cultural substitutes. Despite continued gray whaling, 
Most of the local inhabitants in Chukotka still mourn the loss of bowhead whaling and express a desire to rebuild it as soon as possible. They stress that . . . bowhead whaling formed the basis of their native culture. It is still considered very impor-tant to their national self-consciousness and to the conserva-tion of cultural and linguistic traditions (Krupnik, 1987:29) . 
Simply put, the Eskimos need, not just whales , but bowhead whales. 
The North_ Slope Borough helped by producing several films showing 
the Eskimo perspective on whaling and what the whale and the whale hunt 
mean to the people involved (ACZMN, 1980[28]:24). In 1980, the AEWC invited 
five observers from Friends of the Earth, one of the conservat ion organi-
zations that had given support to the whalers from the start, to see the 
spring hunt in Barrow. These observers reported, "It was apparent to each 
of us that this activity is vitally important to the community (Friends of the 
Earth, 1980)." 
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Outside studies helped confirm the Eskimos claims, showing the im-
portance of the whale in an active, dynamic culture. A Cultural Anthropol-
ogy Panel sponsored by the IWC concluded: 
The bowhead whale complex is the foundation of Eskimo cul-ture and society . The cooperative hunting activities through-out the year and the communal patterns of sharing the whale integrates the society as a cohesive unit. Continued limitations on hunting of the bowhead whale, together with severe re-strictions on other subsistence activities, such as caribou hunting, threaten the survival of Eskimo culture and the or-ganization of their society. . . . the continued appropriation, acquisition and consumption of these resources constitutes the most meaningful and socially sustaining celebration of life in north Alaskan Eskimo communities (IWC, 1982:39-40). 
Not everyone was convinced, however, and many still wished to see the end 
of whaling in any form. 
Management of Whaling: IWC vs. AEWC 
If the recognition of the Eskimos right to whale was gaining groupd, 
the whalers still faced the problem of respect, both for the culture and for 
their capability as managers of the whale. As Jacob Adams stated in his ad-
dress to the First Conference on the Biology of the Bowhead Whale, 
The history of actions affecting the Alaska Eskimo hunt of the bowhead whale is a sad drama of failure to accord the native people the consideration and respect they deserve as re spon-sible arctic resource managers (J. Adams , 1982:9) . 
Many observers at the time doubted whether the Eskimos could or would act 
responsibly without strict outside enforcement. And g iven the difficulties 
of outside enfo rcement in Arctic Alask a, these observers worried whether 
there was any _hope of effectively regulat ing the whal ers (e.g., McVay, 
1979). 
Recognizing the sc rutiny to which they wou ld be subjected , the 
whalers made clear in 1978 that they wou ld obey the quota. They felt that 
by foll owing the ru les and acting responsibly, they would find a more re-
ceptive audience during the next round of quota discussions (J. Adam s, 
1979a). Instead, the 1978 IWC meeting was a disaster for the Eskimos. The 
AEWC sought a 2% quota based on the 1978 census estimate of 2260 whales (ACZMN, 1978[13]; IWC, 1979c). This foundered on IWC resistance, and, in the 
whalers' opinion, the ineffectiveness of the U.S. delegates' negotiations (ACZMN, 1978[13]). 
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The whalers were dejected by this meeting. The AEWC walked out of 
the proceedings, and Jacob Adams issued the following statement: 
The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC) hereby gives 
notice to the International Whaling Commission that it objects to any action taken by the IWC concerning bowhead whales. By filing this objection, the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commis-
sion removes itself from any asserted jurisdiction of the IWC. The Alaskan Eskimo whalers will conduct a bowhead hunt in the fall and next spring. That hunt will only be subject to AEWC regulations . 
Despite the good faith efforts of Eskimo whalers to abide by 
an unjust quota of 12 landed or 18 struck whales during 1978, the IWC ignored the proposal of the United States to permit a hunt at a level to meet nutritional and cultural needs. The IWC ignored the advice of people who know most about the bow-head whale and who are most interested in its conservation (in ACZMN, 1978[13]:6). 
While not a member of the IWC and therefore unable to object formally, 
this statement obviously reflects great bitterness at the IWC's intransi-
gence. The whalers had suffered from the 1978 quota (Worl, 1979b), and 
vowed, "Never again will the whalers agree to allow unfair political bias .-to 
affect their natural pursuit of happiness (AEWC, 1979:2)." 
Despite their opposition to the IWC's actions, the whalers felt a need 
to exercise proper management over the hunt. They had also found a voice 
m the AEWC. In a January 1979 meeting between officers of the Barrow 
Whalers Association and the AEWC, Eugene Brower asked why the AEWC was 
presenting a management plan, "since the Barrow Whalers agreed to an 
AEWC Management Plan for one year only (AEWC, 1979:3)." Jacob Adams ex-
plained that, although not trying to follow IWC directives, 
the AEWC feels that it is a good idea to continuously maintain 
an accepted management plan which addresses the concerns 
raised over our whaling. For example, following the AEWC 2% 
conservation plan in order to show people that the Eskimos' harvest is well below the natural recrui tment rate of these 
whales (ibid.:4). 
The one year trial in response to outside pressures was over, and the AEWC 
had evolved into the institution representing Eskimo whaling. 
Concl usion 
The IWC ban of Eskimo bowhead whaling in 1977 created a tremen-
dous controversy. Not a great deal was known to western science abou t the 
bowhead, nor was a great deal known about Eskimo whaling. While battles 
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about aboriginal rights raged on, often in ignorance of the facts of the sit-
uation, the whalers also began a practical response to the actions from the 
outside. They formed the AEWC, and through it fought for their rights to 
whale, and fought to show the outside world the cultural significance of the 
whale in the Eskimo communities. 
With the establishment of a quota in place of a total ban, the whalers 
were able to continue whaling, though in a severely limited way. Through 
the AEWC, the whalers established a means of expressing their displeasure 
and their concerns , and to fight for the right to whale. In assuming a man-
agement role, the AEWC filled a gap that concerned many observers. But the 
AEWC was constrained by the Federal government, which claimed manage-
ment authority. Within the Eskimo community, the AEWC had begun to es-
tablish itself as a permanent and useful institution. 
.----
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Chapter 3 
Here to Stay 
ENCOURAGED by the Cooperative Agreement entered into by 
the US government and the AEWC and the good will and effort 
shown by the Inupiat people of Alaska . . . 
THE IWC COMMENDS the Inupiat people of Alaska on their ef-
forts to control the hunt, and their essential contribution of 
finance and effort in the gathering and provision of data and 
research. 
--In ternational Whaling Commission (1982a:36) 
Problems of Management from Outside 
At the 1978 IWC meeting, the AEWC suggested to the U.S. delegates 
that the U.S. should object to the IWC's jurisdiction over aboriginal whaling. 
By so doing, the U.S. could resume its leadership in seeking a moratorium 
on commercial whaling. It was with this reasoning that Eben Hopson filed 
suit against Juanita Kreps, arguing that only the U.S. Congress had the 
power to limit aboriginal whaling, since authority only over commercial 
whaling had been granted to the IWC (ACZMN, 1978(13]:6). Hopson stated 
that: 
The lawsuit does not mean that the hunt will be unregulated 
or the whale population endangered. It simply means that in-
ternal rather than international regulations will be followed (ibid.). 
While receptive to the goals of hunt management, the whalers had had 
enough of politics. 
The feelings of the whalers were summarized in an article in the 
journal Indian Affairs: 
The Inupiat Eskimos of today are fighting for their survival as 
a people against a harsher environment than any they have 
ever known. The victims of derogatory and untruthful public 
relations campaigns by environmental extremists, subjected 
to politics masquerading under the guise of biological science 
and living under the threat of armed suppression of the bow-
head hunt , they already have been severely injured . Their 
survival as a people depends in large measure on the outcome 
of their present struggle (Indian Affairs , 1978 -79:8). 
Understandably the Eskimos were re luctant to leave regulatory authority to 
the outsiders who had caused the crisis in the first place. 
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way: 
Phrasing their position more constructively , the AEWC put it this 
For centuries Alaska Eskimos have hunted the bowhead whale 
in a controlled and intelligent fashion. Hunters who have 
shown disrespect to the bowhead by harvesting it in an inef-
ficient way have been ostracized · from the community. Nev-
ertheless, the Eskimos realized that even the most ingrained 
traditions sometimes need emphasis and reinforcement, par-
ticularly when outside forces are promoting social change 
(AEWC, 1981a). 
Management could only be effective if it included the hunters in the as-
sessment of the situation. 
The failure to acknowledge the role of the Native hunters as a part of 
the system led to the AEWC walk-out of the IWC meeting. The Eskimos felt 
that only they understood and appreciated their position. After the 1978 
spring harvest, the whalers threatened to ignore the IWC quota. Jacob 
Adams stated: 
The time for Eskimo sacrifice has passed. The personal and 
communal upheaval that resulted from compliance with this 
Spring's unfair IWC quota will not be repeated. That compli-
ance occurred for a reason: to give the scientists time to show 
what the Eskimos already knew abvout the whales, and to give 
the U.S. and the IWC a chance to develop an equitable method 
of management, and thereby to redeem themselves from their 
past injustices to Alaskan Eskimos. All that resulted, however, 
was that the scientific standards for exactitude were raised 
and the conservationists again used the Eskimos as a pawn in 
their commercial whaling conservation game. The Eskimos do 
not want to hinder the work of the IWC, but they cannot let 
themselves be destroyed to preserve the IWC. They demand 
that rationality and fairness prevail at the IWC. 
The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission has filed an objec-
tion to the IWC action on Bowhead whales, thereby symboli-
cally and - perhaps legally removing its applicablitiy to them. 
For the fall hunt and for 1979, the Eskimo whalers will ignore 
the IWC limits and will proceed as follows: 
1. They will engage in their own research on the bow 
head; 
2. Hunting methods and subsistence need limits will be 
established under AEWC management; 
3 . Those Uni ted States regulations implementing the IWC 
quota will be ignored; and 
4. The jurisdiction of the IWC over Bowhead whaling by 
Alaskan Eskimos will be challenged in court. 
(J. Adams, 1979b:1 2) 
.-~ 
The point of this was not any desire to break the law, but a feel ing that an 
unfair regu lation could not be tolerated. 
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For Barrow, this was not the first time outside laws had been broken. In 1961, Inupiat hunters who had taken ducks out of season were arrested. Worl and Smythe describe the reaction of the other hunters: 
The arrest ... led to the famous "Duck-In" incident in which a hundred hunters brought their ducks and demanded to be ar-rested as well. The case was dropped, but the issue of hunting rights had been raised in the minds of the Inupiat (Worl and Smythe, 1986:47). 
When unfair and uninformed laws create hardship, the responsible course for the community is to stand up to them. The Duck-In concerned tradi-
tional hunting rights. The bowhead issue involved a great deal more. 
The Federal Government's Perspective 
From the government's point of view as well, the bowhead was a 
very important issue. Although the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) had not informed the Eskimos of the IWC's concern prior to 1977 , 
the agency had begun spending large amounts of money on bowhead re-=-
search. In 1974, $52,000 was spent on the project, increasing by 1977 to $309,000. In 1978, the first conplete census was carried out, at a cost of $921,000 (ACZMN, 1979[18]:3). NMFS undoubtedly felt it was making a sub-
stantial effort to find out the status of the bowhead. On such a closely-
watched issue as bowhead whaling, NMFS's authority and ability were being tested. 
To monitor the harvest, NMFS had officers present during the 
whaling season (M. Adams, pers. comm.). The agency did not have the abil-ity to enforce the harvest limits by itself, and so looked to the AEWC to help 
with management in 1977 (ACZMN, 1977[6]:3). Through the AEWC, NMFS 
could establish reliable communications with the whalers, to forestall the 
problems that had led to the initial ban. While this worked in 1978, by 1979 
the whalers were again feeling distrustful of the government's intention to 
support the Eskimos' position. 
The main source of trouble was the whalers' feeling that the U.S. was 
unwilling to stand up to what were perceived as the political machinations 
of the IWC. While NMFS was sponsoring a large research effort into the 
whale, the whalers felt that, once again, they were left out of the consider-
ations of the authorities (J. Adams, 1979a). In a memorandum to the AEWC 
commissioners, Chairman Jacob Adams wrote: 
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Given this difficult situation , the only way to avoid or mm1 -mize conflict is for the Eskimos to exercise responsible self-regulation through the AEWC (ibid.). 
The difficulty lay in convincing the U.S. government, and the IWC, that 
this was appropriate and effective. 
For the fall hunt of 1978, the U.S. had successfully negotiated two ad-
ditional strikes from the IWC (see Table 3). The Eskimos promised to ignore 
the IWC quota, and regulate the catch themselves . The weather, however, 
prevented any fall hunt at Barrow, enforcing the harvest limit more ef-
fectively than anything else could have done. NMFS had announced that in 
the event of quota violations, investigations but not prosecutions would be 
made (ACZMN, 1978[15]:4). An article in the Arctic Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Newsletter commented: 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 } 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989-91 
Quota (struck/landed) Landed Struck-but-lost Total Harvest 
20/14 
27/18 
26/18 
65/45 
· 43 strikes 
32 strikes 
32 strikes 
35 strikes 
12 
18 
18 
16 
5 
11 
12 
11 
20 
22 
23 
6 
9 
9 
9 
8 
5 
13 
6 
8 
9 
6 
41/44 per year, three strike carry-over per year 
Table 3. Quota and Harvest, 1978-91 (AEWC files) 
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18 
27 
27 
25 
13 
16 
25 
17 
28 
31 
29 
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The Eskimos' attitude toward possible governmental attempts 
to enforce the IWC quota is not one of hostility but rather one 
of disbelief: "The U.S. government can't and won't enforce the 
illegal IWC quota. It's illegal and unfair; and our government 
knows it. We are regulating ours.elves. They can't take away 
our way of life," said one Eskimo whaling captain (ibid.:4). 
This perceived ambivalence on the part of NMFS, caught between the 
whalers and the IWC, was naturally a source of conflict. The AEWC suffered 
from no such internal conflict, and felt better equipped to do the job. 
The 1979 Hunt 
The 1979 spring hunt, like the previous fall's, was hindered by bad 
weather. Only six whales were landed, again preventing the whalers from 
reaching either the IWC quota or AEWC harvest limits (ACZMN, 1979(22)). A 
successful fall hunt brought the totals up to the IWC limit. The whalers's 
plans to exercise their own management had not gone unnoticed at ~h$ 
IWC, which drily noted that "The catch appeared to be limited by the 
weather more than by the quota (IWC, 1980: 104)." 
Elders in the community blamed the low catch on the arrogance of 
the whalers in stating how many whales they would catch (Langdon, 
1984:49). A whale presents itself to a worthy hunter, an arrangement 
which cannot be violated (Attungana, 1985; Pulu et al., n.d. :26-7). During 
the 1979 hunt, whalers reported a dead whale being "rescued" by four other 
whales, as is said to happen when a whale is not ready to be taken (ACZMN, 
1979(20]:10). Worl (1979a, b) notes that this change in the relationship be-
tween the whalers and the whales is the most significant aspect of the 
quota system--the whales no longer decide how many will give themselves 
to the whalers. 
The 1980 Hunt and Grand Jury Investigation 
In 1980, the issue came to a head. Initially, the IWC claimed the 
whalers had exceeded the 1980 quota by five strikes, and had continued 
whaling after the season had ended in 1979 (IWC, 1981). Later, their figures 
showed an excess of eight strikes for 1980 (IWC, 1982a). Curiously, the IWC 
took this opportunity to pass a resolution commending the whalers on their 
efforts to control the hunt and to help gather information about the 
whales. The only cautionary note urged the whalers to hunt only sexually 
immature whales and to reduce the struck-but-lost total to zero (ibid.:36). 
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The U.S. government, on the other hand, was not so willing to look to 
the future. The federal district attorney in Anchorage began a grand jury 
investigation of alleged quota violations during the 1980 hunt. This was 
greeted with dismay and outrage. Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska called the 
probe "a despotic attempt to intimidate Arctic Slope Eskimos (in Abbott , 
1980)." Jacob Adams described it as an ;'ill-conceived witch hunt (ibid.)." 
Even U.S. attorneys questioned the validity of the investigation (Hunter, 
1980). One reporter wrote, "The State Department ordered prosecution of 
four Eskimo whalers as a diplomatic tool, and the U.S. attorneys here [in 
Anchorage] agreed to prosecute only under threats of firing (Blewett, 
1980)." The Anchorage Daily News wrote an editorial arguing that the 
investigation was a waste of time and energy that could come to no good 
(Anchorage Daily News, 1980). 
In defense of the government's actions, Deputy Attorney Charles 
Renfrew wrote to Congressman Don Young of Alaska: 
The grand jury investigation, to which you refer, was initi-
ated only after the fullest consideration of the matter. 
The information available to the Department of Justice in-
dicated that the illegal activity was most likely to be repeated 
and had been engaged in after the fullest possible notice to 
the individual communities involved in whaling activities. 
Another important factor was the fact that, in addition to the 
obligation of the Department to enforce our criminal laws, the 
United States has the obligation to enforce our commitments 
under international treaties controlling such whaling. The 
activities in question are in violation of both the criminal 
laws and our treaty obligations (Renfrew, 1980). 
The Department has the right and the obligation to investigate violations. 
But was such an investigation merited in this case? 
The Friends of the Earth observers in Barrow for the spring hurit m 
1980 reported: 
As the AEWC had set its own quota for the hunt this year--two 
percent of the best estimated population, or 45 whales--no one 
knew until the day the captains decided to come off the ice if 
the IWC quota would be exceeded or not. It was impressive to us 
that, in light of their strongly-held feeling that the present 
quota is unfair . the crews did come off the ice when the 
struck quota of 26 was reached (Friends of the Earth, 1980). 
AEWC files show a total of 27 strikes and 18 landed whales for 1980, versus 
an IWC quota of 26 and 18. AEWC attorneys pointed out that the govern-
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ment's figures were not published at the time of the alleged violations, be-
cause the government was unsure about the number of strikes: 
Given the amount of confusion and doubt as to whether the 1980 quota was either never reached or exceeded, any crimi-
nal investigation of the taking of an additional bowhead in 
the fall hunting season by a · whaling captain is merely 
harassment and should be quashed (Van Ness, Feldman & Sutcliffe, 1980). 
The underlying cause of this situation was the combative relation-
ship between the government and the whalers. The whalers, unsure of the 
government's understanding of the Eskimos and its commitment to them, 
were further antagonized by the presence of armed enforcement officers 
from NMFS (M. Adams, pers. comm.). Because they had been let down in the 
past, the whalers were also very wary of the government. As Marie Adams 
says , "We were at odds ." In retrospect, the relationship between the whalers 
and the government had not been stable before the grand jury problem. 
An untenable position had broken. 
Breakthrough 
In early 1981, the stalemate seemed locked. In response to the pro-
posed rules regarding bow head whaling issued by NOAA in January, the 
AEWC filed its comments on the rules, noting: 
The AEWC files these comments under protest and does not by 
commenting concede that the Secretary of Commerce has 
statutory authority . . . to regulate subsistence whaling by Alaskan Eskimos (AEWC, 1981b:1). 
The whalers were angry at having been left out of making the rules, ,and at 
the continued us~ of out-of-date, discredited or incomplete data to formulate 
bowhead whaling regulations (ibid.). The government having successfully 
obtained contempt-of-court orders against two of the individuals involved 
m the grand jury investigation, a dark cloud still loomed over the scene. 
Then came the breakthrough. After months of planning strategy 
with its attorneys, the AEWC entered negotiations with NOAA. Senator 
Stevens gave his considerable support to the whalers, making the negotia-
tions much easier (M. Adams, pers. comm.). The result of the negotiations, 
and the major step in securing effective management of bowhead whaling, 
was entitled "Cooperative Agreement between the National Oceanic and 
33 
Atmospheric Administration and the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission" 
(NOAA and AEWC, 1981), signed March 26, 1981 (see Appendix 1). 
Under the Cooperative Agreement, NOAA delegates reponsibility for 
management of Eskimo whaling to the AEWC. While reserving the right to 
withdraw the authority given to the AEWC, NOAA (and thus NMFS) stepped 
back from its direct involvement with the hunt. The Arctic Coastal Zone 
Management Newsletter heralded this as "The first U.S . commitment of the 
management of a subsistence resource to the subsistence users 
(1981[34]:3)." In the same issue, Rosita Worl commented: 
The management plan is based on customary laws, some of 
which have been codified in a few of the communities , bio-
logical principles, and a scientific research orientation. . . . 
While traditional laws may have their limitation in the ap-
plicability to formal governmental regulations , they never-
theless may form the basis for effective resource management 
(Worl, 1981:15, 17). 
Finally, through self-regulation, the whalers could be assured of know I-
edgeable management of the harvest. .--
Following the adoption of the Agreement, the grand jury investiga-
tion was dropped in April , 1981. Senator Stevens , in the spirit of concilia-
tion, called the investigation: 
a cultural misunderstanding. . . . It took time for them to real-
ize they were dealing with a cultural problem. . . . You can't 
j ust look at a tradition like that and say it is violating federal 
law (ACZMN, 1981[34]:3). 
Under the terms of the Agreement and the AEWC Management Plan , the 
AEWC could levy fines for violations of hunting methods or of the quota . 
Alongside the Agreement was a government provision that would allow up 
to fifteen extra whales to be landed over the quota of seventeen, for a fine 
of $1,000 per extra whale. Criminal penalties had been replaced by civil 
ones, which were to be assessed by the AEWC. 
Another provision of the Agreement is that the AEWC must provide 
harvest reports to NOAA for each spring and fall hunt, including informa-
tion on the number of whales landed and descriptions of the circumstances 
of whales lost, with estimates of the chance of survival of the whale . In the 
first such report, on the spring hunt of 1981, the AEWC stated: 
The United States government believes that the most effective 
aboriginal bowhead hunt management requires joint man -
agement by the Eskimos and the government. The AEWC is 
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greatly encouraged by this spirit of cooperation and looks forward to continuing to work closely with the government to 
ensure that future hunts will be well managed (AEWC, 1981c:1). 
The AEWC noted good compliance with the Management Plan and good co-
operation with research scientists. Three violations of the Management 
Plan were reported; in each case, the whaler had not attached a line and 
float to the whale prior to firing a bomb (ibid.). 
Responsibility and Controversy 
Of course, with the authority of self-regulation comes the responsi-
bility to manage effectively. The AEWC now had to allocate village quotas 
out of the overall quota, investigate violations and continue its efforts to 
improve the . efficiency of the hunt. The Agreement also meant that the 
AEWC had to abide by the outside quotas, applied through NOAA (Langdon, 
1984:50-1). The AEWC found itself in a dual role as an advocate of aboriginal 
whaling and as the enforcer of the IWC-established quota. 
This last aspect of the Agreement brought about renewed contr;: 
versy among the whalers in 1982. After a successful first year, the Agree-
ment was tested by bad weather and ice conditions. Only thirteen whales 
were struck and five landed between all nine villages (AEWC files). Barrow 
landed no whales, having lost all of its allocated five strikes (Alaska Con-
sultants and Stephen Braund, 1984:A41; E. Brower, 1982). Billy Neakok, 
President of Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope (ICAS), the tribal orga-
nization of the Inupiat, wrote a stinging and bitter letter to all those in-
volved or concerned with regulating Eskimo whaling (Neakok, 1982). ICAS 
also passed a resolution attempting to decertify the AEWC (ICAS, 1982) , 
which had in part received its authority from ICAS (ICAS, 1978). ICA's in 
1981 had also called on the AEWC to uphold its responsibility to Inupiat 
sovereignty by no~ entering into the Cooperative Agreement with NOAA 
(ICAS, 1981). 
By this stage, Neakok's view was that of the minority. He called on 
the whalers to continue the hunt to provide for the community, saying that 
the alternative was to let people starve (Neakok, 1982). After receiving the 
letter, . Eugene Brower, President of the Barrow Whaling Captains Asso-
ciation, called a meeting of the Barrow whalers. The letter came as a sur-
prise to the whalers, who voted to abide by the existing quota (BWCA, 
1982:4). Tom Brower, Sr., referring to Neakok's letter, stated: 
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The content of this letter is strong to me. I want to see it an-
swered and some apology [made] to the Federal government. 
The whale census should be continued, and we have approved 
the quota for the spring (ibid . :2) . 
Edward Hopson pointed out: 
We have had [AEWC] Commissioners that have been praised by 
the IWC . ... We should take a careful look on this letter and 
abide with our quota this year. If we break our agreement, it 
will be more difficult to manage over whaling by AEWC next 
year (ibid.). 
Eugene Brower wrote back to Neakok: "The Barrow Whaling Captains Asso-
ciation will comply with the established quota," sending copies to the orga-
nizations to which Neakok's letter had been directed (E. Brower, 1982). De-
spite the unhappiness of the whalers at not landing a whale , the AEWC's po-
sition in the community was strong enough to prevent a violation that 
would damage its credibility. 
At this time, views outside the whaling villages were also changing. 
The IWC published a Special Issue Report entitled Aboriginal!Subsisten·ce 
W ha Ii ng, examining the special considerations of aboriginal and subsis-
tence whaling as compared to commercial whaling (IWC, 1982b) . Recog-
nizing the special situation of subsistence whalers, the IWC was in a posi-
tion to revise its approach to subsistence whaling management. The tone of 
the IWC reports on Eskimo bowhead whaling changes in the reports of the 
early 1980s from one of begrudging tolerance to one of greater respect and 
sensit ivity (see IWC Chairman's Reports and Reports of the Scientific Com-
mittee for this period) . This is not to say that the IWC now supports the Es-
kimos . The whalers feel that the IWC should not and does not have authority 
over them (author's obs.). Nonetheless, the relationship has improved con-
siderably. 
The AEWC Management Plan 
The key to the success of the whalers and of the AEWC has been the 
successful implementation of the AEWC Management Plan (see Appendix 2). 
Developed in response to the IWC ban in 1977, the Plan was put into its pre-
sent form in 1981, when under the Cooperative Agreement the AEWC was 
gi ven the power to enforce the Plan. Reporting on the formation of the 
AEWC, the Arctic Coastal Zone Management Newsletter commented: 
It is expected that the new Whaling Commission will be the 
vehicle for the development of any subsistence whaling reg-
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ulations that might be developed. . . . [NMFS sees] the Alaska 
Eskimo Whaling Commission as evidence of progress toward 
cooperative management being sought by the International 
Whaling Commission .... The NSB [North Slope Borough] re-
gards the organization of the Eskimo Whaling Commission to 
be an important milestone in Arctic Coastal Zone Management. 
It could pioneer in the complex politics of management of 
subsistence resources both on shore and off (ACZMN, 
1977[6]:3). 
Three and a half years later, this optimism was rewarded, and the AEW
C was 
indeed able to begin cooperative management of bowhead whaling. 
According to Marie Adams, the AEWC had been reacting to outside
 
forces until the grand jury investigations. That probe started the AEWC 
moving forward, a change which culminated in the development of 
the Co-
operative Agreement. At this point, "real movement began": the AEW
C had 
an expressed and authorized purpose to manage the whale hunt,
 rather 
than a general mandate to protect the rights· of the whalers (M. Adams, 
pers. comm.). 
The inclusion of the whalers in the management of the hunt ha
d 
strong support at the time, and has drawn favorable responses from
 many 
observers. The IWC Cultural Anthropology Panel wrote: 
Eskimo involvement in research and management is neces-
sary for several reasons. First, documented research results 
are not available in many areas, and the Eskimos are often 
possessors of exclusive knowledge. . . . Second, Eskimo partici-
pation in management greatly enhances the potential success 
of the management regime. . .. Finally, participation by Eski-
mos is a most efficient means of disseminating information 
concerning the management regime (IWC, 1982c:45). 
On the subject of wildlife management in Greenland, Kapel and Petersen 
write: 
Game regulations passed by local authorities seem to be re-
garded as the most relevant for the practicing hunters , in that 
they seem to be more conscientiously obeyed than govern-
ment notes and international agreements at a central level. . . 
. Game regulations seem to be better observed the more clearly 
the underlying reasons are understood by and brought to the 
attent ion of the hunters and in this connection game regula-
tions at the local authority level seem to be the best for effec-
tive management (Kapel and Petersen, 198 2: 70). 
The relevance to Alaska Eskimo whalers is clear. 
Involving the wha lers themselves in the management and report ing
 
of the hunt means that information can pass both ways qu ick ly an
d with -
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out impediment. Strikes are reported immediately, and a constant tally is 
kept to ensure that no over-quota strikes occur simply because no one 
knew how many had been made. This is a vast improvement over the cir-
cumstances that led to the grand jury investigation. It is possible because of 
the use of CB radios by everyone concerned with the hunt. Communications 
are kept open continuously during whaling season, so that other crews are 
alerted in time to assist in catching a struck whale (author's obs .; M. Adams, 
pers. comm.). Suppressing news of a strike is nearly impossible. 
Enforcement 
Enforcing the regulations of the Management Plan is also a much 
easier task when done by the AEWC. As Marie Adams says, "Captains are 
more willing to listen to one of their own (pers . comm.)." A violator re-
ceives a hearing in front of his peers , not an outside body. Fines are paid to 
the AEWC, and denial of hunting rights for a specific period is in keeping 
with traditional methods of controlling wasteful or disrespectful hunters 
(AEWC, 1981a; Worl, 1981:16). 
Most violations of the Management Plan come under Subsection 
100.24: Permissible Harvesting Methods. Typically, the shoulder gun is fired 
before a line is attached. This was one of the problems in the 1970s that led 
to so many struck-but -lost whales. Jacob Adams says the fines have cut 
down on the number of violations, but sometimes whalers get over-excited 
and fire the shoulder gun first (pers. comm.). For these incidents, penalties 
are generally assessed at the minimum level: $1,000 fine and a one year 
suspension of the violator (e.g., M. Adams, 1983; Silook, 1983; AEWC, 1983:5; 
A. Brower, Jr., 1987). 
Hunting Over the Quota 
For the more serious violation of hunting over-quota, stricter mea-
sures must be taken . Percy Nusunginya, a Barrow whaling captain, in 1985 
and 1988 knowingly hunted beyond Barrow's village quota. In so doing, 
Nusunginya and his crew claimed they were following traditional law and 
custom which neither the IWC nor anyone else had any right to supersede 
(Barrow Sun, 1989:6; author's abs.). In his trial in 1989, Nusunginya stated 
his case: 
My family has been whalers since time immemorial we have been whale hunters, sea mammal hunters. And we understand 
the anthropomorphism of the animal. We Inupiat , Eskimos, believe the animals think like us . . . . Before any Inupiat 
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hunter or whaler goes out hunting, they do not make prede-
termination on how much, or how many, they're going to get. 
Their belief is that the animals out there who they are going 
to be hunting are listening. So, therefore, the Inupiat do not 
make a predetermination on how much they would get so that 
is why I have been opposing the quota system (Barrow Sun , 
1989:7). 
It is this change in the cultural view of how whales and whalers interact 
that Worl argues is the most profound effect of the quota (Worl, 1979a, b). 
But in attempting to uphold one cultural norm, Nusunginya abandoned an-
other: that of cooperation and consensus within the community. 
Following Nusunginya's violations in 1985, the AEWC fined him a to-
tal of $20,000, and suspended him from whaling for five years. Lennie 
Lane, then-Chairman of the AEWC, said in a press release: 
No one likes the quota system. But every whaling captain ex-
cept one has agreed to go along this year in the hope that the 
International Whaling Commission will finally treat us fairly . 
. . . Our traditions teach us to act together in community with · 
nature and one another. It tears at the fabric of our culture 
when one person defies elder whalers. We will do everything 
in our power to enforce our rules (AEWC, 1985c). 
The AEWC also requested that the case be referred to a NOAA administrative 
law judge fo r further determinations regarding Nusunginya's violations 
(Lane, 1985). Anthony Calio of NOAA wrote back: 
I do not believe it appropriate at this time to involve the NOAA 
administrative law judge in what would amount to a rehearing 
of proceedings already conducted by the AEWC. . In light of 
the AEWC's action against Mr. Nusunginya . . . I do not dispute 
that the AEWC has acted responsibly in try ing to control the 
spring bowhead harvest, pursuant to the Cooperative Agree -
ment and the AEWC's Management Plan (Calio , 1985). · 
For the moment , the situation was stable. Only the village quota had been 
exceeded, not the overall quota, and so Nusunginya was not liable for fed -
eral penal ties (AEWC, 1987a). 
In 198 8, Nusunginya again went ou t whaling after Barrow's quota 
had been reached. This was too much . The Barrow Whaling Captains Associ-
ation expelled him, and the AEW C fo llowed sui t (J. Adams, pers . comm.). The 
case was turned over to the federal couts, and Nusunginya was tried in 
Fairbanks. In his dec ision, Judge Andrew Kleinfled said : 
If you since rely believe , as you 're entitled to, that the IWC has 
no right to regul ate whaling, you 're entitled to think that, and 
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I believe you're entitled to say it, you're just not entitled to do 
anything about it (Barrow Sun , 1989:7). 
Kleinfeld fined Nusunginya $3,000 and sentenced him to two months con-
finement and three years probation, during which time he would be pro-
hibited from whaling. In explaining the sentence, Kleinfeld continued: 
I want your incarceration to take place during this year's 
whaling season. It appears to me essential for two reasons. One 
reason is, the people of Barrow, when they ask, "Where is Percy Nusunginya?" should get the answer, "He is in jail be-
cause he whaled in violation of the AEWC provisions during 
the whaling season." . . . Second, I don't particularly want you 
to get into more trouble by feeling compelled to go and hunt 
whales during this year's whaling season. (ibid.:8, 18). 
In Nusunginya, the AEWC found a violator they could not control. 
With the Cooperative Agreement, however, they were able to turn the mat-
ter over to someone who could. What will happen when Nusunginya re-
turns to Barrow for the 1990 harvest is an open question. He has pushed 
beyond the limits of AEWC enforcement, but because the AEWC can call in 
the federal government for assistance, Nusunginya is not a threat to AEWC 
authority. 
Conclusion 
The imposition of the IWC quota and the U.S. government's accep-
tance of it created a tense, bitter stand-off from 1978 to 1981 between the 
whalers and the federal agencies charged with regulating the whale hunt. 
Following . threats to go over-quota, and stalemated by the grand jury 
investigation of the 1980 hunt, the AEWC pushed forward in 1981 to negoti-
ate the Cooperative Agreement with NOAA. Under this agreement, the AEWC 
manages the hunt and enforces its Management Plan and other relevant 
laws, reporting its activities to NOAA. The Agreement was a major break-
through that continues to work smoothly. 
The AEWC's record under the Cooperative Agreement has been ex -
cellent. The hunt has been managed effectively, minor violations have 
been handled internally, and the two major violations by Percy 
Nusunginya have resulted in his expulsion from both the Barrow Whaling 
Captains Association and the AEWC. As an institution, the AEWC is strong 
and well-respected both within the community and outside it. AEWC man-
agement of bowhead whaling is an unqualified success. 
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Chapter 4 
New Challenges 
The expectation and hope of the Alaska Eskimo subsistence 
whalers is that the penthrite projectile, used in combination 
with the new recovery technology, will enable the 
whalers to conduct a safer, more humane and more efficient 
bowhead hunt. 
--Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (1988d :4) 
We continue to have serious concerns regarding the adverse 
impact of offshore oil and gas activities on endangered ma-
rine mammals, including the bowhead whale. 
--Thomas Napageak, AEWC Chairman (1989a) 
Improving Whaling 
The AEWC has been an effective advocate and manager of Eskimo 
bowhead whaling. It has also provided a forum for sharing knowledge and 
expertise among the whalers and for promoting improvements in both 
equipment and techniques that lead to a more efficient harvest. Because 
the basic purpose of subsistence whaling is to provide food for the commu-
nity, comprehensive management of the harvest includes the efforts of the 
whalers to improve their ability to provide that food. We shall now examine 
that side of AEWC management. 
The first major improvement was the regulation that a line and float 
must be attached to the whale at the same time as or before the shoulder 
gun was fired. In fact, this was not a new development, but a return to older 
techniques. In the early 1970s whaling had gotten out of hand, not so much 
by numbers or effort, but by losing touch with the wisdom of the elqers. 
The AEWC has made a big effort to help the elders share their knowledge 
with the younger whalers through workshops and other programs (e.g., 
Attungana, 1985; M. - Adams, pers. comm.). 
During a discussion on whaling improvements between officers of 
the AEWC and the Barrow Whaling Captains Association, 
several persons remarked on and re-emphasized that the 
whaling captains and crew are · the physical elements which 
make each execution safe, fast and without loss (AEWC, 1979:2). 
The AEWC reported in 1988: 
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Figure 3. Hunting Efficiency, % Landed of Struck Whales, 1974-88 
(AEWC files; Alaska Consultants and Stephen Braund, 1984:29) 
Weapons instruction is also offered each year at the AEWC's 
Annual Whaling Captains' Convention. In this "hunting 
efficiency" workshop elders from the different villages pro-
vide instruction on the most successful techniques for strik-
ing the whale--i.e., how to position the boat and where to 
strike to produce an instant kill. This workshop alone has re-
sulted in a substantial increase in the efficiency of the hunt, 
with the 1986 and 1987 seasons both producing an efficiency 
rate of 71 % (AEWC, I988a:8). 
There is no substitute for expert knowledge (see Figure 3). 
Weapons Improvement 
A more tangible part of the AEWC's efforts has been the weapons im-
provement program. At the onset of the bow head controversy, the Eskimo 
whalers were caught in double jeopardy: 
The conservationists also object to Eskimo use of "modern" 
weapons to hunt the bowhead but fail to point out that these 
"modern" weapons are replicas of the weapons introduced to 
the Eskimo in the days of Yankee whaling .... These "modem" 
weapons have been in use by us since the 1880s and we have 
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not been allowed to improve these weapons even though they 
are responsible for some losses of struck whales (AEWC, 
1977:2). 
As Thornton had noted the inefficiency of the old-style lances compared to 
the bombs of the Yankee whalers in the nineteenth century (1931: 170-1 ), 
the present-day whalers knew their weapons were outdated. Since the 
numbers of struck but lost whales caused so much concern, both at the IWC 
and for the whalers, improvements in technology would help all con-
cerned. The traditional techniques of Eskimo whaling are sound (e.g., Bock-
stoce, 1986; C. Brower, 1942). Improvements were needed primarily in two 
areas: a more effective bomb and a means of locating lost whales. These 
changes would affect neither the character nor the practice of the hunt, 
but would make the harvest more efficient and reliable. 
The whale bombs, although an improvement over lances, are still not 
completely reliable. Failure to detonate and failure to kill the whale quickly 
are the main shortcomings of these bombs, which use black powder as the 
explosive (AEWC, 1979:1; also see AEWC, 1981c and other harvest reports). 
The IWC's Sub-Committee on Humane Killing Techniques noted: 
The hand harpooning methods and those employed by Alaskan 
Eskimos are both inefficient and undeniably prolong death 
times. 
Loss of whales struck but not landed is inevitable (IWC, 1979d:92). 
The AEWC weapons improvement program was started with three objec-
tives: 
(1) to increase the lethality of the projectile used in both the 
darting gun and the shoulder gun; (2) to increase the relia-
bility of the projectile exploding; and (3) to increase safety 
factors in general (AEWC, 1985b: 1). 
The explosive and the fuse were the main objects of this improvement ef-
fort. 
The improvements were not instant successes . In the 1985 hunt, 
mishaps occurred, including one premature detonation (ibid.:3). In 1986, 
the IWC's Humane Killing Working Group recommended that the whalers 
try a new weapons program. Egil Oen, a Norwegian weapons expert, made 
suggestions, including the use of penthrite as the explosive. The AEWC 
contracted with Oen and manufacturer Henrik Henriksen to produce a new 
penthrite bomb. The AEWC stated: 
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the penthrite bomb is expected to provide both a more effi-
cient and more humane bowhead hunt (AEWC, 1987b:3-5). 
In 1988, the penthrite bombs were used with great success . The AEWC 
reported: 
As of the date of this report, 7 bowhead whales have been 
struck with the penthrite projectile. Six of the whales were 
landed , while severe weather conditions prevented the land-
ing of the seventh. In each case, the penthrite projectile per-
formed according to specification, with no indication of de-
sign or material defect or of mechanical malfuction. 
The behavior of the whales struck with the penthrite 
. projectiles and a preliminary analysis of the autopsies per-
formed on 5 of the whales indicate that each of the animals 
died or lost consciousness within seconds of the detonation of 
the penthrite projectile. The whales struck with the penthrite 
projectiles were taken with fewer bombs, and they lost con-
sciousness and died much more quickly and humanely than 
the bowheads taken with the old black powder projectiles 
(AEWC, 1988d: 1). 
The enthusiastic response of the whalers to the penthrite bombs can be 
gauged from the response of Edward Itta, who landed a whale in May 1988 
without a penthrite projectile. While his whale was being cut up on the ice, 
he told Oen and Henriksen who were observing the harvest, "You have 
done a great thing for the Eskimo people. We cannot thank you enough. 
This new bomb is a great thing (author's abs.) ." 
Radio Floats 
The other major effort has been in attempting to recover lost whales. 
Dr. Erich Pollmann of the University of Alaska has been developing a radio 
transmitter float which would allow tracking of whales even in poor 
' weather. This program is proving to be very successful. Trials have been 
made during the fall hunt in Kaktovik and Nuiqsut, and the floats and 
transmitters have - worked perfectly in all nine attempts to use them 
(Follmann, 1987; AEWC, 1987b:6-7). The AEWC reported: 
With the installation of the transmitters three years ago, the 
results have been excellent. In the past three years, only one 
whale has been lost and several of those landed were located 
with the aid of the transmitters. One whale was located 30 
miles off the coast by an airplane tracking the radio-trans-
mitter (AEWC, 1988a:9). 
Ice conditions during the spring hunt make use of a radio transmit-
ter difficult. Struck whales may swim under the ice, dragging the float with 
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them, and saltwater blocks signal transmission (ibid.). A new idea is being 
developed to overcome this: acoustic "pingers" which could be located with 
a portable hydrophone. The sound would not be stopped by the ice. The 
AEWC plans to test the two together during the 1989 spring hunt (ibid.: 10). 
The AEWC's 1988 report on hunting efficiency concludes: 
With the improvements made to the projectiles used in the 
Native Alaskan subsistence hunt and with the new recovery 
aids--the radio transmitter and the acoustic "pingers"--the 
AEWC and the whaling captains expect a continuation of the 
increase in hunting efficiency of their hunt. By using tech-
niques practiced over centuries and today's inventions, the 
whalers hope to reach their goal of a struck/landed ratio of 
75% or more. The result of these improvements will be a safer, 
more humane and effective way to hunt the bowhead whale (ibid.). 
The AEWC provides an effective mechanism for helping the whalers im-
prove their harvest, increasing their ability to provide the nutritional and 
spiritual sustenance of the bowhead whale. 
Need-Based Quotas 
The usual basis for IWC quotas is an estimate of the capacity of the 
stock to sustain the harvest of whales. For the bowhead, this estimate is 
made with imprecise data. The calculations of net recruitment rate and 
other figures have caused arguments and accusations of bad faith (ACZMN, 
1978[13]:3-6). A different approach to the quota is to try to determine the 
historical need of the communities, and then to compare that figure with 
what is known about the whale population. 
Stephen Braund, Sam Stoker and John Kruse compiled data from 1910 
to 1969 as a baseline comparing whales landed with village populations 
(Braund et al., 1988). This base period allows calculations of need after the 
commercial era and before the events of the 1970s--a period of minimal 
outside influence on whaling. For each village in each year, the number of 
whales is divided by the population of the village. This number averaged 
over the base period is multiplied by the present population to give the 
number of bowheads needed today (see Table 4) . The researchers ' figure of 
41 bowheads landed is the basis for the current three year quota of 41 
landed or 44 struck per year. The team also projected the futui·e popul ation 
of the whaling villages to 2020, and calculated a need then of 48 landed 
whales (ibi d. :59 ). 
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Quantifying the Eskimos' need recognizes the importance of the 
whalers in their interaction with the bowhead. The AEWC's goal of pro-
tecting the harvest is greatly helped by removing the guesswork from this 
half of the equation. The Eskimos' historical need for bowheads is as im-
portant as the historical bowhead population and is critical to the effective 
management of subsistence whaling. 
The Next Threat: Development 
The third side of AEWC management is the protection of the bow-
head's habitat. In the context of increased interest in offshore develop-
ment, the AEWC's biggest challenge is protecting the marine ecosystem so 
that it will contine to provide the subsistence resources that support the 
Eskimo communities along the Arctic coast. Concern about the risks of off-
shore development existed before the AEWC, but as the representative of 
the whalers and the focus of the Eskimos' ties to the sea, the AEWC has 
pushed for tight constraints on offshore activities. 
Village 
Gambell 
Landed whales per capita. 
1910-69 
0.00572 
Savoonga/1 0.00572 
Wales 0.000724 
Kivalina 0.003240 
Point Hope 0.016764 
Wainwright 0.010072 
Barrow -0.008481 
Nuiqsut/1 0.008481 
Kaktovik 0.009174 
--------- -
----- --- -
Region 0.008815 
Current Eskimo 
Population 
495 
485 
154 
275 
534 
445 
1,823 
227 
154 
4,592 
Current Need 
(rounded) 
3 
3 
1 
1 
9 
5 
16 
2 
1 
41 
1/There are no data for Savoonga and Nuiqsut for landed bowheads between 1910 
and 1969. The Gambell per capita need is used for Savoonga, Barrow's for Nuiqsut. 
Table 4. Subsistence and Cultural Need for Landed Bowhcad Whales 
(Braund et al., 1988: 56) 
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For the whalers there are two main concerns with offshore activity. 
First, the noise of the drilling rigs and the support ships may affect the mi-
gration routes and patterns of the whales. Little is currently known about 
the whales' reactions to industrial noise, but they appear very sensitive to 
such noises as snowmachines driving across the ice and outboard motors 
(author's abs. from the whalers). The second concern is the possibility of 
an oil spill. 
Because much of the activity occurs near the coast, the whalers fear 
that the noise may push the whales further out to sea, beyond the reach of 
the whalers. So far, this has primarily been a concern for the fall harvest 
from Kaktovik, Nuiqsut and Barrow. Drilling has been confined to the 
Beaufort Sea, and has not affected the whales spring migration. However, 
lease sales and drilling plans in the Chukchi Sea threaten to change this 
(Edward Hopson, pers. comm.). Bockstoce notes apparent changes in the 
whales' behavior after commercial whalers began hunting bowheads 
(1986:101), and whalers today report unusual behavior by whales migrat-
ing past Barrow in the fall, having passed through industrial activity in 
the Beaufort Sea (Hopson, pers. comm.). 
The whalers are understandably concerned. But what can they do 
about it? Alaska's State territorial waters extend three miles offshore; be-
yond that, only the federal government has jurisdiction. While the State 
has been cooperative in placing seasonal limitations and other restrictions 
on drilling activities, the federal government has opened its leases to year 
round drilling (Jessica Lefevre, pers. comm.) . The AEWC has no power or 
authority in the leasing process, which is administered by the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) of the Department of the Interior. The AEWC 
can only make its views known to MMS and NOAA, calling for appropriate 
limitations on drilling and comprehensive safety standards to guard 
against spills (Hopson, pers . comm.). 
In 1986, the oil companies and the whalers produced a coopera-
tive agreement. The stated purpose of the agreement was to ensure com-
munication and cooperation between the oil companies and the whalers, so 
that drilling and ship traffic would not interfere with the hunt 
(Oil/Whalers Working Group, 1986:i-iii). This seems to work reasonably well 
(Neilsen, 1988:68-8; Edward Hopson, pers. comm.) , but its long-term impact 
may be very different. Neilsen cautions: 
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it seems hard to accept that the oil companies can buy their 
way out of threats to Inupiat culture and whaling as well as 
environmental damage. 
The oil industry benefits from public relations by "helping 
the Inupiat whalers," while the Imupiat have gone a further 
step backwards, pressed by an ever-growing resource hungry 
industry (Neilsen, 1986:69). 
Jessica Lefevre, an AEWC attorney, sees the oil/whalers agreement as a 
one-sided arrangement, lasting only until the industry is granted a permit 
to "take" a bowhead (pers. comm.). 
A group of six oil companies applied in 1988 for permissi on for the 
"incidental take" of bowhead and gray whales during the Outer Continental 
Shelf operations (Amoco Production Company, Inc., et al., 1988). (In this 
context, "take" is defined as killing, harming or harrassing whales.) In 
submitting AEWC comments on the industry petition, then-Chairman 
Thomas Napageak wrote: 
the AEWC believes that it may be possible for exploration in · 
the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas to proceed with a negligible 
impact on endangered marine mammals and without an ad-
verse impact on Native Alaskan subsistence hunting activi-
ties. However, the present application does not provide 
enough information to ensure such a result (Napageak, 1988). 
The AEWC's comments are concerned with the inadequacy of information 
about anticipated impact and with the possibility of lethal takes by industry 
(AEWC, 1988b) . The legal mechanisms exist to regulate the industry strictly 
(e.g., under the Marine Mammal Protection Act). The AEWC must try to en-
sure that those regulations are enforced. 
The second, and more ominous, threat from industry is the possibility 
of an oil spill contaminating the bowhead's habitat or coming in direct 
contact with the whales. The spill of 200,000 barrels of oil from the Exxon 
Valdez in March 1989 showed the industry's inability to handle a disaster of 
that scale (see Anchorage Daily News, March 24, 1989, and the following 
weeks). Whatever the intentions of the oil companies, their promises ring 
hollow after the Valdez accident. A draft report by an industry task group 
in 1983 on Arctic oil spills promises adequate response by various tech-
niques (Industry task Group, 1983). One of these, an ice-breaking hover-
barge, · proved useless during the rescue of two gray whales trapped in the 
ice near Barrow in October 1988 (Hess, 1988:28). It seems unlikely that any 
effective response to an Arctic oil spill could be made. 
48 
Outside AEWC Authority 
In this as well, the AEWC has no authority, and can only try to influ-
ence the federal government's decisions regarding its operating standards 
and liability requirements for activities in Arctic waters. ICAS in 1981 filed 
a lawsuit claiming Inupiat sovereignty over the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas 
beyond the State territorial limit (ACZMN, 1981 [33]:ll). The North Slope Bor-
ough in 1986 filed suit to halt exploration for ten days during the fall whale 
hunt (Neilsen, 1988:66). These and other similar lawsuits failed: 
A sad proof that commercial consideration weighs more than 
cultural and environmental concern (ibid.). 
In this battle the whalers have been left on their own. The North 
Slope Borough opposes Outer Continental Shelf activities (Matumeak, 1988), 
but they have no jurisdiction there. Environmentalists seem content to 
fight onshore drilling but to let offshore activity proceed unopposed 
(Jessica Lefevre, pers. comm.; author's ohs.) . Whether the AEWC can con-
clude a cooperative agreement with the oil companies that offers true pro-
tection for the whales and the whalers while allowing exploration to take 
place remains to be seen. Gambell notes, 
It would be ironic indeed if the hard-won accomodation be-
tween the conservaton of the stock and the subsistence needs 
of the aboriginal hunters were rendered irrelevant by an 
outside factor of this kind (Gambell, 1983:472). 
For the whalers it would not be ironic. It would be catastrophic. 
One theme of AEWC management has been the recognition that the 
whalers are part of the bowhead's ecosystem. In line with this approach to 
an overall system, the management of the bowhead must expand to become 
part of a regional marine resource management regime. Such a regime is 
certainly beyond th_e scope of the AEWC, but without one, the AEWC's efforts 
will be ineffective against the pressures of industrial development. Coop-
erative management between government, subsistence hunters and in -
dustry would be capable of providing for the needs of all concerned. 
Conclusion 
The AEWC's efforts at improving the whaling skills and tools of its 
members have been effective. Because of the limitations of the quota, 
hunting efficiency is of great importance. By sponsoring workshops to 
help elder whalers pass on their knowledge, the AEWC has helped ensure a 
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continuity m culture and in activity among the whaling communities 
during a time of rapid change. The AEWC has promoted the development of 
better weapons and tools--such as the penthrite bomb and the radio float--
to improve the efficiency of the harvest. Both the workshops and the 
weapons improvement programs have led to great reductions of struck but 
lost whales. 
The AEWC's attempts to protect the bowhead's habitat from the effects 
of industrial development have not been so successful. Oil exploration near 
the coast and on the Outer Continental Shelf threaten to disrupt the migra-
tion patterns and behavior of the bowheads, and the possibility of an oil 
spill is a great danger to the whales. The pressure to develop these re-
sources has created less restrictive regulations for activity in Federal wa-
ters. Litigation has not yet produced a victory for the whalers, and there 
are no other channels for direct action on their part. The challenge ahead 
for bowhead management is to find a way to ensure habitat protection in 
the face of seemingly inevitable development. 
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Chapter 5 
The AEWC's Success 
The Eskimos deserve a lot of credit. They've had very good 
people working on their side, and they've had the patience to 
go along for ten years before getting credit and vindication. 
--Stephen R . Braund 
I, a whaling captain like yourselves, would like to express the 
appreciation I feel towards the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Com-
mission, and toward those of you who have been leading this 
organization's most valiant fight to protect our way of life and 
culture. The success of this effort was so abundantly demon-
strated this past spring and fall, as we gathered together at 
feasts and celebrations all along the Arctic coast, to share the 
muktuk and mikigaq from the 20 bowhead we brought home to 
our people; to feel the oil upon our hands, and the warmth 
inside our bodies. 
--NSB Mayor George N. Ahmaogak, Sr.(1987) 
Perseverance, Achievement and Respect 
The AEWC is a success. It has achieved its stated objectives--protect-
ing the bowhead hunt , promoting educational efforts regarding the hunt, 
undertaking research projects--and has established itself as a powerful, 
stable and useful institution in the whaling communities. This has not been 
accomplished, however, without great efforts by the whalers and those 
working with them--attorneys, scientists, and the local, state and federal 
agencies that helped with funding and research. A decade of perseverance 
by the whalers has paid off in changed attitudes about and approaches to 
aboriginal subsistence whaling. The quota, still an annoying intrusion, is 
much less restrictive. As Jacob Adams says, "We won (pers. comm.)." 
The AEWC in this regard is held up as a model by other subsistence 
hunting groups. The whalers have earned the respect of those who would 
regulate their whaling. The AEWC has forcefully shown the effectiveness 
of local, hunter-oriented management in the context of subsistence hunt-
ing. Superficially, such an arrangement seems like the wolves guarding 
the sheep. But that is simplistic , and does not take into account the inter-
relationship between the hunter and the resource. Whales are not the pets 
or the possessions of an absentee landlord; whalers are not marauding in-
terlopers. In the words of elder whaler Patrick Attungana: 
Our body fluids are mixed with the blood of the animals, with 
the oil of the animals (1985:3). 
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The AEWC has been able to incorporate both traditional concepts and west-
ern scientific concepts into one system of management. This is a key ele-
ment of its success. 
Other Native Interest in Bowhead Whaling 
The efforts of the whalers and the U.S. government to establish a co-
operative research and management program have been acclaimed by So-
viet researchers trying to re-establish bowhead whaling along the 
Chukchi Peninsula (Bogoslovskaya et al., 1982:398). The Soviet researchers 
are interested in restoring the cultural pillar of the bowhead harvest to the 
Chukotkan Natives, by allowing the harvest of three whales (ibid.; Krup-
nik, 1987). The work of the AEWC has given legitimacy to the claims of abo-
riginal whalers, and has shown that subsistence whaling deserves protec-
tion. 
In 1988, the Aklavik Hunters and Trappers Committee (HTC) of 
Aklavik, Northwest Territories, Canada, made a request for the harvest of 
one bowhead, stating: 
We need this for the survival of the Inuvialuit tradition, cul-
ture and skills thus filling in some of the generation gaps 
between the young and the old (Aklavik Hunters and Trappers 
Committee, 1988:2). 
The Canadian government advised the HTC to seek advice first from the 
AEWC. Billy Archie, President of the HTC, said in a presentation to the AEWC: 
The Iirnvialuit commend the Inupiat on their long and diffi-
cult road in gaining international respect and recognition as 
the leading experts on all subjects concerning the bowhead 
whale (Archie, 1989). 
The HTC requested assistance from the AEWC in the form of moral support 
and technical advice about whaling and about the process of obtaining a 
quota (ibid.). Although the AEWC has no authority to grant quotas outside 
the nine Alaska whaling villages, Thomas Napageak wrote to Andy Car-
penter of the Inuvialuit Game Council: 
When you have obtained a permit or allocation ... , we will be 
very happy to assist you in preparing for a successful and 
humane bowhead hunt. This would involve inviting you to our 
hunting workshops and introducing you to the use of our new 
penthrite bomb (Napageak, 1989b). 
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An April 1989 news report said that the Inuvialuit will probably receive a 
permit for a bowhead the following summer from the Canadian govern-
ment (Spence, 1989:2). 
Other Cooperative Management Regimes 
The lessons of hunter management have not been lost on other sub-
sistence groups . In a speech on cooperative management of marine mam-
mals, Director of the North Slope Borough Department of Wildlife Manage-
ment Ben Nageak said: 
Never again must the knowledge of aboriginal people be sec-
ond guessed. The use of cooperative management and agree-
ments between statewide, federal, international and local en-
tities must be encouraged and implemented whenever possi-
ble. Since the formation of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Com-
mission, there have been several organizations formed in or-
der to do what the AEWC has been able to do with the bowhead 
whale. . . . Each of these organizations . . . is working hand in 
hand with both the State and Federal governments in order to · 
achieve the goal of cooperation on the management of our 
marine mammals (Nageak, 1989:4-5). 
Let us examine two of these organizations. 
The Eskimo Walrus Commission (EWC) was formed in 1978 in response 
to a quota system established by the State of Alaska in 1976. The quota and 
other restrictions were felt to be excessively strict, especially since the 
walrus population was healthy. Langdon observes: 
The establishment of the AEWC in 1977 provided a model for 
the walrus hunters and several of the founders of the walrus 
commission had participated in the forming of the AEWC pro-
viding them with useful experience (Langdon, 1984:59). 
With similar purposes to the AEWC--protecting the harvest, encouraging 
research, promoting _ local involvement in management--the EWC prepared 
a management plan in 1984 (ibid.:61), and in 1987 entered into an agree-
ment with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game. 
This agreement declares: 
That there should be open and continuous communication and 
exchange of information among agencies and groups inter-
ested in the health, well -being, and utilization of the Pacific 
walrus and that a sound management policy for this 
species is best implemented as the result of mutual coopcra-
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tion and assistance (U.S . Fish and Wildlife Service et al. , 
1987: 1). 
One major difference between the AEWC and the EWC is enforcement: the 
U.S . Fish and Wildlife Service retains full authority to enforce laws re -
gard in g walrus. Nageak calls this agreement "an important first step 
(1989:8)." Perhaps because the controversy of walrus hunting has not been 
as intense as that over the bowhead , there has been less pressure to create 
an agreement that is as far-reaching as the bowhead Cooperative Agree-
ment. In any case, the present situation is far better than when the State 
first imposed its quotas. 
External pressure to limit subsistence harvests is the main incentive 
to form user groups. The possibility of IWC action involving beluga whales 
has added to concern about changes in whale distribution and perhaps 
population in recent years (Nageak, 1989: 12-3). Geoff Carroll, a biologist 
with the North Slope Borough, initiated efforts by local groups to create a 
self-regulatory regime and to assist in research efforts to obtain the sort of 
information that was not known about bowheads until after the IWC im-
posed its ban. Having such a regulatory mechanism in place and having 
the quantified biological information could preempt any IWC action or at 
least minimize its impact (Carroll, pers. comm.) . 
In 1988, beluga hunters met in Fairbanks to organize a committee. 
Because of the shared beluga population, Inuvialuit hunters from the 
Northwest Territories were invited to join. The result is the Alaska and In-
uvialuit Beluga Whale Committee (AIBWC), which in March 1989 adopted 
bylaws. The purpose of the AIBWC is to: 
facilitate and promote wise conservation, management , and 
u tilization of beluga whales based on the best available in-
fo rm ation and soc ioeconomic considerations (AIBWC, 1989). 
Included in thi s i-s provi din g information to the public , working to protect 
beluga habitat , promoting research and harvest improvements , and advo-
cating interna tional cooperati on on beluga conse rv ation and management 
(ibid.). 
Followi ng the experiences of the AEWC and the EWC and recogni zing 
the merit of co-management from the start, the AIBWC includes members 
from both the beluga hunting communities and from NMFS and the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game (Carroll, pers. comm.). Others can be added by 
vote of the Committee. Only representatives of the hunting communities 
can vote on hunting matters, but in other respects the government repre-
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sentatives are fu ll members of the Committee. It is too soon to evaluate the 
performance of the AIBWC, but the concept is sound and follows the trend 
started by the AEWC of extensive local involvement in the management of 
sub sistence resources. 
Conclusions 
If imitation is the sincerest form of flatte ry , the Alaska Eskimo 
Whaling Commission has many genuine admirers. Created in a turbulent 
time, nurtured amid controversy, and made strong by the will of its mem-
bers, the AEWC is a hardy, appropriate and effective institution . Its success 
has been in achieving its goal of protecting bowhead whaling and also in 
proving by example the ability of Native hunters to provide leadership in 
proper management of a subsistence resource . The former is the AEWC's 
contribution to the whaling villages; the latter, to the general practices of 
wildlife management . 
Withstanding attacks from inside the community such as the . ICAS 
conflict in 1982, and subject to great pressures from the outside, such as the 
1980 grand jury investigation, the AEWC has shown resilience and har-
diness. The whalers endured the sufferings of few or no whales due to the 
quota they felt was unfair, and in the AEWC they created a way to make 
themselves heard . Despite internal conflicts over such matters as the allo-
cation of v ill age quotas, the AEW C remains the represent ative of the 
whaling villages , allied in common cause. 
Much of the AEWC's strength comes from the approp riateness of 
such a body in the context of the whaling communities. The wh alers orga-
ni zed themselves and established the AEWC in a manne r consistent with 
trad itional custom (Worl, 1981). Having its foundation firmly in \he Eskimo 
culture allowed the AEWC to incorporate Western scienti fi c ideas into the 
management of whaling without losing sight of the importance of the 
whale and tlie relationship between the whale and the whaler. It is appro-
priate that those with the most interest in the whale should be those most 
invo lved in managing it. 
AEWC management is also the most effective course . Management by 
an outside agency did not work in the 1970s. Whi le the quota is still seen as 
unnecessary and unfair, the AEWC's management efforts have led to in-
creased efficiency in the harvest and accurate monitoring of strikes and 
landings of whales. The whalers are much more willing to cooperate with 
their own people than with outsiders. Government assistance and oversigl,t 
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helps the AEWC achieve its management and research goals, but the AEWC 
is an effective buffer between the government agencies and the individual 
whalers and whaling communities. 
While the AEWC has protected the whale harvest and earned respect 
for its management efforts, it still faces many challenges . The main con-
cern is over offshore drilling and the risks of interfering with bowhead 
migration and behavior and of an oil spill. The AEWC has no power to con-
trol the decisions made about offshore industrial activity, and can only try 
to exert its influence on the decision-making process. If need be, the AEWC 
will probably attempt legal action, but this has met with little success in the 
past. 
Habitat protection is the looming issue for the next decade and be-
yond. The AEWC must expand its scope to help encourage and provide com-
prehensive regional management of marine resources, which would be 
best accomplished in conjunction and cooperation with the other agencies 
and groups involved in the area. The whalers have shown that by working 
together they can make themselves heard . Their challenge is to continue to 
do so . 
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Appendix 1 
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE ALASKA ESKIMO 
WHALING COMMISSION 
Purpose 
The purpose of this agreement is to provide for cooperation between 
members of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC) and the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in management of 
the bowhead whale hunt for 1981 and 1982 [currently extended to 1991] . 
Responsibilities 
NOAA has primary responsibility within the United States Govern-
ment for management and enforcement of programs concerning the bow-
head whale. The AEWC is an association governing Alaskan Eskimo whalers 
who hunt for bowhead whales. The AEWC adopted a Management Plan on 
March 4, 19 81, to govern hunting for bowhead whales by Al ask an Eskimos. 
Under this cooperative agreement the AEWC will, in cooperation with 
NOAA, manage the 1981 and 1982 bowhead whale hunt. The authority and 
responsibilities of the AEWC are contained in and limited to this Agreement 
and the Management Plan as amended on March 25, 1981, to the extent the 
Management Plan is not inconsistent with this agreement. If the AEWC does 
not meet the conditions of this agreement, or the Management Plan, NOAA 
may withdraw the authority of the AEWC for management and will manage 
the bow head whale hunt in a manner consistent with federal law, this 
agreement and the Management Plan. 
Inspection and Reporting 
NOAA personnel shall monitor the hunt and the AEWC shall assist 
such personnel with such monitoring. The AEWC will provide an oral re-
port to NOAA daily regarding the number of strikes and landings. The AEWC 
will also inform all whaling captains who are engaged in whaling , activi-
ties of the number of whales struck or landed at all times. The AEWC will 
also provide a report to NOAA within 30 days after the conclusion of the 
spring hunt and the fall hunt containing at least the following informa-
tion: 
(1) The number, dates, and locations of every strike or landing; 
(2) The length (as determined from the point of the upper jaw to the 
notch between the tail flukes), the extreme width of the flukes, and 
the sex of the bowhead whales landed; 
(3) The length and sex of a fetus , if present, in a landed bowhead whale; 
and 
(4) An explanation of circumstances associated with the striking of any 
bowhead not landed , and an estimate of whether a harpoon or bomb 
emplacement caused a wound which might be fatal to the animal (e.g., the harpoon entered a major organ of the body cavity and the 
bomb exploded). 
57 
I 
NOAA will provide technical assistance in collection of the above m-
formation. The AEWC shall assist appropriate persons in collection of 
specimens from landed whales, including but not limited to ovaries, ear 
plugs, and baleen plates. Such specimens shall be available to appropriate 
government officials. NOAA personnel cooperating with AEWC will work 
closely with the AEWC Commissioner in each whaling village to facilitate 
the accurate monitoring of the hunt. 
Management 
( 1) No more than a total of 32 whales shall be struck in 1981 [amended 
yearly]. The AEWC and NOAA shall determine the total number of whales 
that may be struck in 1982 through negotiations that shall be concluded 
by March 15, 1982. 
(2) The AEWC may determine the allocation of these permitted strikes 
among the whaling villages. 
(3) The AEWC agrees that whaling captains will be subject to civil monetary 
assessments for whales struck over the strike limit contained in this 
agreement, and for whales landed over 17 in 1981 or 1982 (if 17 are not 
landed in 1981) or over 15 in 1982, if 17 are landed in 1981. The AEWC 
will collect the assessments from the whaling captains and will deposit 
them with NOAA representatives. In the event of a dispute between 
NOAA and the AEWC over the number of whales landed or struck, or the 
amount of the assessment, or other factual matters, NOAA will consult 
with the AEWC about the matter. If the dispute cannot be resolved, it will 
be referred to a NOAA administrative law judge for determination under 
a trial-like administrative proceeding of factual findings and the 
amount of assessment. The procedures contained in 50 CFR §§ 218.21-
218.25 will control these proceedings. The decision of the administrative 
law judge may be appealed to the Administrator of NOAA. Whaling cap-
tains may also be liable for civil assessments for other violations of the 
management plan as determined by the AEWC or by an administrative 
law judge under the procedures described above. 
Authorities 
This cooperative agreement is concluded under the authorities gov-
erning management of living marine resources, including but not limited 
to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. 
Durat i on 
This agreement expires on December 31, 1982 [now, 1991]. 
Co ns ul t ati on 
NOAA and the AEWC shall consult during the operat ion of this 
agreement concerning the matters addressed herein as well ~s other mat-
ters related to bowhead whale management which either party believes 
are suitable for such consultation. 
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Amendment 
This agreement may be amended by the written agreement of the 
parties. 
Done in duplicate in Washington, D.C., on the 26th of March, 1981. 
James P. Walsh 
For NOAA 
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Eugene Brower 
· For the Alaska Eskimo Whaling 
Commission 
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Appendix 2 
AEWC MANAGEMENT PLAN 
Subpart A Introduction 
§ 100.1 Purpose of Regulations 
It is the purpose of the regulations contained herein to: (a) insure 
an efficient subsistence harvest of bowhead whales; and (b) to provide a 
means within the Alaskan Eskimo customs and institutions of limiting the 
bowhead whale harvest in order to prevent the extinction of such species. 
§ 100.2 Scope of Regulations 
The regulation contained herein applies to the subsistence hunting 
of bowhead whales by Eskimos located in the State of Alaska. 
Subpart B Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission 
§100.11 Powers 
(a) The Alsaka Eskimo Whaling Commission (hereinafter AEWC) is 
empowered to administer the regulations contained herein to insure that 
the purpose of § 100.1 of these regulations are attained. 
(b) The AEWC is empowered to enforce these regulations by : 
(1) denying any person who violates these regulations the right to 
participate in hunting the bowhead whale. 
(2) making civil assessments. 
(3) acting as an enforcement agent for any governmental entity 
authorized to enforce these regulations. 
(c) The AEWC is empowered to promulgate interim regulations that 
are in addition to, but not inconsistent with, regulations contained herein. 
§100.12 Duties 
(a) The AEWC shall administer and enforce the regulations contained 
herein (including any interim regulations). 
(b) The AEWC shall conduct village educational programs to facilitate 
compliance with these regulations, including training programs for 
whaling captains and crews. 
(c) The AEWC shall initiate research for improvement of the ' accu-
racy and reliability of weapons. 
Subpart C Regulations 
§100.21 Definitions 
(a) "bow head whale" means a whale whose scientific name is Bal -
aena mysticetus and which migrates past whaling villages in Alaska. 
(b) "captain" means the person in charge of a whaling crew. 
(c) "harvest" means to kill and bring to shore or butchering area. 
(d) "non-traditional weapon" rneans any instrument that could be 
used to harvest a bowhead whale that is not a traditional weapon. 
(e) "traditional weapon" means a harpoon with line attached, darting 
gun, shoulder gun, lance or any other weapon approved by the AEWC as 
such a weapon in order to improve the efficiency of the bowhead whale 
harvest. 
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(i) "harpoon with line attached" means a harpoon with a rotating 
· head which is atttached to a line and float and which has no 
explosive charge. 
(ii) "darting gun harpoon" means a harpoon with an explosive 
charge and with a line and float attached. 
(iii) "shoulder gun" means a whaling gun , adapted fron the era of 
commercial whaling in the 19th Century, which has an explo-
sive charge and which has no attached line and float. 
(iv ) "lance" means a non-explosive sharply pointed weapon with-
out a harpoon head . 
(f) "whaling crew" means those persons who participate directly in 
the harvest or attempted harvest of the bowhead whale and were under the 
supervision of a captain. 
(g) "whaling village" means the Alaska Eskimo village in which re-
sides a whaling captain and crew which participate in the harvest of bow-
head whales and which is represented by a Commissioner of the AEWC. 
(h) "whaling season" means customary period of time during which 
the bowhead whale is harvested, either in the Spring or Fall. 
§100.22 Registration 
(a) Each captain shall register with the AEWC on forms provided by 
the AEWC for that purpose which disclose his name, address, age, qualifica-
tions as captain, names of the crew members, name(s) of harpooner(s), and 
his willingness to abide by the regulations of the AEWC and to require his 
crew to abide by those regulations. 
(b) The AEWC shall take into account any reading or language diffi-
culties in developing procedures and forms for registration . 
§100.23 Reports 
(a) Each whaling captain shall be responsible for keeping a written 
record of the number of whales: 
(1) attempted to be harvested by using traditional weapons but not 
harvested, 
(2) harvested by the captain or his crew, and 
(3) sighted by the captain or his crew. 
(b) Each whaling captain shall report the date , place , and time of 
any striking not resulting in harvesting and shall describe: 
(1) the size and type of bowhead whale, 
(2) any known later attempted harvest or actual harvest of said 
wha le, 
(3) the reason for the captain or crew not harvesti ng the whale, 
i.e., environmental factors, the failure of traditional weapons, 
or other reason, and 
(4) the condition of the whale that was not harvested. 
(c) Each whaling captain shall make such other reports as the AEWC 
requires in order to accomplish the purposes of the regulations herein or 
in order to advance the scientific knowledge of the bowhead whale. 
§100.24 Permissible Harvesting Methods 
(a) No whaling captain or crew shall harvest or attempt to harvest 
the bowhead whale in any manner other than the traditional harvesting 
manner. 
(b) "Traditional harvesting manner means: 
(1) only traditional weapons shall be used, as defined in § 100.2 l(e). 
(2) the bowhead whale may be struck with a harpoon or darting 
gun with line and float attached or simultaneously with har-
poon and shoulder gun or darting gun. 
(3) the shoulder gun may be used 
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(i) when accompanied by harpoon with or without a darting 
gun 
(ii) after a line has been secured to the bow head whale, or 
(iii) when pursuing a wounded bowhead whale with a float at-
tached to it. 
(4) the lance may be used after a line has been secured to the 
bowhead whale. 
§100.25 Traditional Proprietary Claim 
The bowhead whale shall belong to the captain and crew which first 
strikes the bowhead whale in the manner described in § 100.24. 
§ 100.26 Level of Harvest 
(a) The AEWC shall establish the levels of harvest or attempted har-
vest for each whaling village during the season or seasons. 
(b) In establishing the levels of harvest or attempted harvest, the 
AEWC shall consult with each whaling village. 
§ 100.31 Denial of Participation in Harvest 
(a) Any person who the AEWC determines has violated the regula-
tions herein shall, after opportunity for a hearing before the AEWC, be 
prohibited from harvesting or attempting to harvest the bow head · whale 
for a period of not less than one whaling season nor more than five whal -
ing seasons. 
(b) Any person who violates the regulations contained herein shall 
be subject to a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $10 ,000 as assessed 
by the AEWC. No person shall harvest or attempt to harvest the bowhead 
whale until such fine has been paid. 
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